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Gentithes: Precedent, Humility, and Justice

PRECEDENT, HUMILITY, AND JUSTICE
By: Michael Gentithes'
ABSTRACT
When resolving cases, appellate courts must quickly decide how much respect to give precedent decisions and the analytical approaches they embody.
While the logical and philosophical justifications for reliance on precedent
have been frequent topics in jurisprudentialstudies, this Article takes a unique
perspective that will reinforce the role of precedent by emphasizing its necessary pride of place in any outcome that can be considered substantively just.
Arguing against more decisionist models of adjudicationand building upon
prior pragmatic and Dworkinianjustifications for the special role of precedent, this Article suggests first that appellate judges must approach their profession with humility to achieve substantively just results. After more fully
defining the partially constitutive relationship between judicial humility and
justice, the Article then contends that such humility necessarily implies respect
for precedent. This respect for precedent has both a cross-generationaldimension, in light of the refinement of the law over time, and a horizontal dimension, in light of the collegiality required for appellate judges to agreeably
resolve the cases on their dockets. Precedent is therefore vital in all cases, even
those decided on constitutionalgrounds. Such a humble, precedent-based approach to adjudication also has several implicationsfor the process of appellate decision making.
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INTRODUCTION

In the aisles of any Anglo-American law library, the breadth of
volumes confronting law students is somewhere between overwhelming and alarming. Aspiring attorneys struggle to conceive of internalizing such a vast network of previously announced decisions covering
almost any subject in detail far too minute to distill into a ten-page

course outline. The easiest (and perhaps most common) reaction is to
regard those volumes as the dead hand of authors who lack contemporary relevance, focusing instead on the business of determining the
proper outcome of legal controversies in the present.
Such reactions are understandable from an overwhelmed new jurisprude. Yet appellate court judges take the same approach with alarming frequency when confronted with interminable volumes of
precedent. Rather than carefully investigating and understanding
those authorities, many judges react by determining the "correct" decision and either utilizing snippets of supporting case law or ignoring
prior decisions altogether.2 To the layman, that reaction seems apropos. At first blush, when a court relies on precedent in reaching its
conclusion it counterintuitively follows the course laid down in a past
decision without regard for that decision's accuracy in principle. 3 But
does an appellate judge really work an injustice by largely relying
upon precedent, even at the level of adopting the analytical approach
suggested in prior cases, when rendering a decision?' In this Article, I
aim to describe the role precedent should play for such a judge, offer2. This is not to say that all appellate judges disregard the value of precedent, at
least not explicitly. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1, 30 (2010) (noting

the affirmations of stare decisis from then-judges Roberts and Alito during their confirmation hearings).
3. Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice

in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2033 (1996) ("Stare decisis demands that courts
conform their decisions to decisions reached by previous courts, and sometimes those
previous decisions will have been unjust. Stare decisis, that is, sometimes requires
courts to reach unjust decisions.").
4. I do not distinguish here between the approaches that should be taken by intermediate appellate and supreme courts in a jurisdiction, although some distinctions
may be possible. Some have argued that the number of cases truly decided by precedent is far higher at the Circuit Court rather than at the Supreme Court level. See,
e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 89-90 (2009) ("[Tlhe population of appellate cases, especially at the Supreme Court level, is heavily weighted
toward disputes whose outcomes are not determined or even very much guided by
existing precedents. When we examine the United States courts of appeals, however,
things are different. Where appellate jurisdiction is a matter of right and not discretionary with the court and where more than 80 percent of the decisions are not only
unanimous but also not thought deserving of even an officially published opinion, we
find far more cases in which an existing mandatory authority appears to dictate a
particular outcome . . . but for the existence of binding precedent."). Though
Schauer's understanding of how a precedent might "determine" an outcome does
make it far less likely at the Supreme Court level, I argue against his sensibility that
precedent is only useful when it is so wholly determinative of outcomes.
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ing a fresh theoretical review of the issue and a new approach to precedent's function. My argument proceeds in two steps; after first
arguing that the idea of a just decision necessarily leaves some internal
space for a conception of judicial humility, I argue that that conception of judicial humility leaves space for reliance on precedent. I
therefore contend that a just decision is necessarily crafted by a humble judge who has consistently and robustly relied on the decisions of
her predecessors.
Again, this position is counterintuitive; many have claimed that
stare decisis requires unjust results at the retail level of individual
cases. The classic objection to judicial reliance on precedent places
more faith in the individual judge to properly decide a present controversy and suggests that thoroughgoing reliance on precedent will frequently compound initial errors in subsequent cases with disastrous
results.' Such views are intuitively appealing, especially to a party
who feels that her legal claim was denied by the dead hand of prior
judges.
There are several existing responses to this challenge, which I consider in turn before presenting my own supplementary theory. The
first line of defense consists of what I call pragmatic (and others have
called "consequentialist") 6 theories of precedent.' According to these
theories, consistent judicial reliance on precedent generates an assortment of ends, such as predictability in the law,' apparent stability in
legal precepts,' preservation of private expectations,"o limitations on
judicial discretion, 1 or efficiency in judicial decision making.1 2
Though the theories vary, each describes these ends as external to
substantive justice itself. The ends are said to promote justice on a
5. See infra Part II.
6. Peters, supra note 3, at 2040; see also id. at n.32 (noting that these terms may
be interchangeable).
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595-96 (1987)
[hereinafter Schauer, Precedent];Theodore M. Benditt, The Rule of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAw 89, 91 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987). I have made my own modest
contribution to this intellectual history. See Michael Gentithes, In Defense of Stare
Decisis, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 799 (2009).
9. Peters, supra note 3, at 2039 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 853-68 (1992)).
10. Id.
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 187 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed.,
2003) ("To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point
out their duty in every particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be
conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a
very considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them.").
12. See, e.g., Schauer, Precedent, supra note 8, at 599 (citing B. CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149-50 (1921)); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (1989).
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wholesale level, while admitting that in individual cases unjust results
will be generated with some frequency.
Alternatively, some argue for judicial reliance on precedent as a
component of what is sometimes referred to as formal justice,13 the
idea that the legal system must treat like cases alike.1 4 These accounts
are apparently deontological, claiming some inherent normative value
in adjudicative consistency or equality outside and apart from substantive justice itself, a value that can be weighed against other normative
goods." Such theories may in part derive the inherent normative
value of precedent from the way similar treatment of similar controversies inures the progression of law with some fairness or comparative justice, giving it a more meaningful appearance than a succession
of wholly unrelated decisions. However, these views are subject to
criticism due to their sequential arbitrariness and potentially circular
nature.
A more nuanced approach to the value of precedent is contained in
Ronald Dworkin's hugely influential law-as-integrity theory.16 This
position can similarly be classified as deontological in that it constructs a norm, integrity, which has its own value distinct from justice." However, his theory tends toward a respect for precedent
simply because of its temporal priority. It ultimately fails to take a
wide-lens view of the development of law, which requires significant
changes to occur cross-generationally, not instantaneously.
While I do not wholly reject these previous defenses of reliance on
precedent, I do believe a supplemental defense is required. I take the
same side as these theorists in the wider contest against more decisionist models that critique genuine reliance on precedent and place
faith in individual judges to reach just decisions. I only highlight the
13. Leslie Green, The Germ of Justice 10-11 (Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 60/2010, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1703008##
14. E.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 159 (2nd ed. 1994) ("Justice is traditionally thought of as maintaining or restoring a balance or proportion, and its leading precept is often formulated as 'Treat like cases alike,' though we need to add to
the latter 'and treat different cases differently.'"). Ronald Dworkin also adopted this
position in earlier work. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1057,
1090 (1975) [hereinafter Dworkin, Hard Cases] ("The gravitational force of a precedent may be explained by appeal, not to the wisdom of enforcing enactments, but to
the fairness of treating like cases alike. A precedent is the report of an earlier political decision; the very fact of that decision, as a piece of political history, provides
some reason for deciding other cases in a similar way in the future."). For my discussion of these views, see infra Part III.B.
15. Peters,supra note 3, at 2041 (describing such arguments as deontological theories of stare decisis).
16. See infra Part IV.
17. This largely borrows from Christopher Peters's description of Dworkin's view.
See Peters, supra note 3, at 2043-44. As I describe in more detail later, Peters suggests that Dworkin ultimately fails in his effort to erect a norm of integrity whose
value lies entirely outside our understanding of justice. Id. at 2080-2111.
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limitations of those prior theories in an effort to demonstrate the utility of my supplemental position. In the spirit of the very claim I am
making, I seek to build upon the work of prior defenders of precedent
in devising a more refined understanding of precedent's role.
Because a single judge cannot consider all the factual variations
covered by the law, she can only be a limited participant in the momentous task of developing and adjusting its course over time. Given
this difficulty, the judge must temper her own ego and, rather than
seek to make her own indelible jurisprudential mark, work as part of a
larger project with colleagues past and present. She must therefore
take a humble approach,'s allowing her to balance the competing aims
of maintaining social cohesion while advancing legal ideals. Judicial
humility is partially constitutive of a just decision, and in turn precedent is partially constitutive of that needed humility.19
As a first step in my argument, I define the relationship between
humility and justice, which admits several possible variations. In the
first instance, humility could be a normative value in and of itself that
remains wholly separate and distinct from substantive justice.
Humility thus conceived would be similar to the value of treating like
cases alike (or possibly Dworkinian integrity) and would have independent normative weight outside of its tendency to either serve or
obstruct justice. Secondly, humility might be an external instrument
useful in the pursuit of just results. Although on this conception
humility lacks normative weight, it derives significance from its tendency to produce a legal system that is just overall, aligning roughly
with the traditional pragmatic defenses. I argue that humility ought to
be conceived of in a third way-as an internal aspect of justice.
Humility is thus partially constitutive of substantive justice in the adjudicative context, not something external to the idea of a just
decision.2 0
The second step of my argument posits that humility (as an internal
aspect of justice) demands, or is partially constituted by, reliance on
precedent even at the thick level of analytical principle. Humility requires such reliance in two ways, which I refer to as the horizontal and
cross-generational dimensions. First, humble judges must act collegially on a horizontal level with one another.2 ' Only by respecting the
analytical dimension of established precedent in a given area and reasoning from the same point of analytical departure can judges hope to
reach consensus with the other members of their court on deeply divi18. See DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 40-41 (2010). Tremendous
credit is due to David Strauss for having similarly highlighted the importance of judicial humility in his work.
19. See infra Part V.
20. While this is my preferred understanding of the relationship between humility
and justice, I note that my theory is not clearly incompatible with the two alternative
understandings I have described.
21. See infra Part VI.
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sive issues. Second, judges must acknowledge their place in a larger
historical project that (one hopes) will extend for many years and
across countless future generations. 22 More than a means to another
normative end, this common law-like process is inherently valuable in
that it allows for ongoing refinement of the law through time and experience.2 While the existing defenses of judicial reliance on precedent describe important components of that practice's value, only this
additional line of argument explains the direct connection between
that practice and a just outcome in an individual case. These two
dimensions of reliance on precedent are therefore internal to the
value of judicial humility24 and in turn are situated internal to substantive justice itself. The argument that stare decisis actually disserves
justice in certain specific cases is based upon a misunderstanding of
the requirements of justice in an adjudicatory context.
Humility and its incumbent respect for precedent seems most
clearly required in the common law, but I also argue for its application
in statutory and, perhaps controversially, constitutional cases.2 5
Rather than disserving justice in the weightiest of conflicts, reliance on
precedent in the constitutional arena is actually a positive development. Reliance on precedent is an inherent dimension of any constitutional decision that can be considered just, and it is therefore a
requirement for any judge who seeks to serve well the court on which
she sits.
In the final sections of the Article, I briefly consider some of the
implications of my position in prescribing an adjudicatory method for
appellate judges. Specifically, I focus on the way in which a judge
crafts her opinions26 and the best approach to overruling precedent on
rare occasions.2 7 Finally, I conclude with a brief summary of my

remarks. 28

II. THE OBJECTION TO JUDICIAL RELIANCE ON PRECEDENT
Although there are a variety of purposes served by a theory of adjudication, any plausible one seeks to reliably decide cases as justly as
possible.2 9 Without deeper examination, it therefore seems that little
22. See infra Part VII.
23. This claim is, of course, largely similar to the argument that the rules of society
"work themselves pure" through common law judicial decision making. See RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 400 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE] (describing this idea behind the common law tradition).
24. Admittedly, the concept of judicial humility may be broader than the two
dimensions I describe in this Article. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part VIII.
26. See infra Part IX.
27. See infra Part X.
28. See infra Part XI.
29. In The Republic, Socrates contends that when the rulers of the state adjudicate
law suits, "their judgments [will] be guided, above everything, by the desire that no
one may appropriate what belongs to others, nor be deprived of what is his own . . .
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priority of place should be reserved for precedent amongst the inputs
to a judicial decision. Reliance on precedent, after all, seemingly requires courts to occasionally reach unjust results since one cannot assume that all prior decisions were correct in either analytical principle
or ultimate outcome.o
The objection to judicial reliance on precedent has historical roots
in a more decisionist adjudicative model, one that claims that a judge
can grasp the notion of justice personally and bring it to bear in individual cases. Plato's vision of the utopian state included philosopherkings with the power to both lead the state and adjudicate lawsuits. 3 1
These philosophers could perceive the "Form" of justice itself and apply that Form in individual cases.3 2 Such leaders should possess "a
mind naturally well-proportioned and graceful, whose native instincts
will permit it to be easily led to apprehend the forms of things as they
really are," including justice. A decisionist model of judges working
from a "clean surface" therefore seems preferable to one based upon
discussion and deliberation with the authors of prior decisions.34 The
philosophical intellect will be capable of deciding justly itself, not as
the product of any reliance upon the work of prior decision makers. 35
The more modern strand of the objection to precedent also emphasizes that precedent is a poorly tailored constraint to judicial discretion. 6 While many objectors believe judicial discretion ought to
somehow be cabined, they maintain that precedent is not up to the
task. Emphasis is given to the potential for blind faith to earlier deci[b]ecause that is just." PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 130 (John Llewelyn Davies & David
James Vaughan trans., Wordsworth Eds. Ltd. 1997) (c. 380 B.C.E.).
30. Peters, supra note 3, at 2033 ("Stare decisis demands that courts conform their
decisions to decisions reached by previous courts, and sometimes those previous decisions will have been unjust. Stare decisis, that is, sometimes requires courts to reach
unjust decisions."). Peters concludes that occasional unjust results may be necessary
in order to address the pragmatic concerns I outlined above, which he considers a part
of a more wholesale conception of justice. Before doing so, Peters does provide an
eloquently-phrased critique of stare decisis as a requirement of treating like cases
alike in most cases outside the constitutional context.
31. See PLATO, supra note 29, at 130, 178. It is the "natural province" of such
philosophers to rule. Id. at 179.
32. Socrates argued to Glaucon that "those who are able to apprehend the eternal
and immutable are philosophers, while those who are incapable of this and who
wander in the region of change and multiformity are not philosophers." Id. at 189.
Therefore, philosophers "are to be thought capable of guarding the laws and customs
of states, and .

.

. [should] be appointed guardians."

Id.

33. Id. at 192-93.
34. Id. at 209. Philosopher-kings will only work on such a clean surface, and "they
will refuse to meddle with man or city, and hesitate to pencil laws, until they have
either found a clear canvas, or made it clear by their own exertion." Id.
35. Plato's decisionist model is also reflected in his reliance upon expertise to flexibly respond to particular exigencies, rather than rigidly constructed codes or texts.
See PLATO, STATESMAN 64 (J.B. Skemp trans., Martin Ostwald ed. 1957).
36. For my own views on the potential for precedent to act as a meaningful constraint both on judicial discretion and on costly and repeated litigation of similar issues, see infra Part IX.
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sions to compound the errors of the past, solidifying early misguidance
because "the basic data [of past decisions] are flawed and decision
making by analogy will simply entrench the errors."3 Objectors thus
argue that reliance on precedent will require an unacceptable sacrifice
of justice at the retail level in individual cases that cannot be redeemed by broader gains in wholesale justice. 8 While a court's discretion should be restrained in difficult cases where any decision will
be controversial, principles other than prior cases, such as legislative
deference or original intent, should guide decisions. 39 More straightforward reasoning about the best possible outcome, all things considered, may even be preferable to reliance on the frequently erroneous
decisions of prior courts.4 0
Such arguments against precedent are at least intuitively appealing.
It is surely little salve to those wronged by a particular legal decision
to explain that their sacrifice is necessary for greater society and that
they cannot obtain just results immediately because to grant such relief would require a more drastic alteration in the landscape of legal
principles than society can currently bear and instead the outcome of
their case must be dictated by decisions in earlier cases. Because any
robust theory of precedent has the potential to compound the mistakes of the past in present cases, such a theory seemingly requires
just this type of sacrifice from individuals who find themselves on the
wrong side of a longstanding and seemingly irrelevant legal precedent.
Theorists have constructed a multitude of responses to this objection, with varying efficacy. While these responses represent important
discussions of the possible value of precedent and its primacy as a
guide for the exercise of judicial discretion, I ultimately conclude that
they fail to fully respond to the decisionists' objection. As I clarify
later in the Article, the objection rests on a misconceived distinction
between a just decision and a decision that humbly relies on the work
of past judges.4 1 This misconception of a just decision emerges but
37. Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1179, 1185 (1999) (citing Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57,
80-87 (1996)).
38. These sorts of individual sacrifices are an unacceptable consequence in a Platonic utopian state, as injury to an individual member of that state through a particular injustice is felt throughout the community, much as an injury to a man's finger is
an injury to the man, not merely to a distinct component of his frame. See PLATO,
supra note 29, at 130-31.
39. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book Review: The Constitution in Conflict,
10 CONsT. COMMENT. 221, 229-31 (1993). Such criticism may have particular
resonance in constitutional cases, where it seems that "[i]f the Constitution is not
alterable whenever the judiciary shall please to alter it, then 'a [judicial precedent]
contrary to the constitution is not law.'" Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible
Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706, 2732 (2003) [hereinafter Paulsen, Marbury] (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
40. Alexander, supra note 37, at 70 (touting reflective equilibrium in judicial decision making).
41. See infra Part V.
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subtly deviates from the traditional defenses of reliance on precedent.
I therefore turn to a description of those positions as a means to illuminate my own view.

III. TRADITIONAL DEFENSES

OF PRECEDENT

As noted in the introduction, the traditional defenses of reliance on

precedent follow several common lines. The two typical retorts are
the argument for wholesale gains offsetting any particular unjust results and the claim that reliance on precedent in all cases is a normative good distinct from justice itself. I discuss these traditional
defenses in turn below.42
A.

Pragmatic Theories

The first traditional defense of judicial reliance on precedent highlights the pragmatic gains derived from that practice. The laundry list
of claims made under this rubric is long and amoebic, but the important connection between these views is that each posits a distinct practical end allegedly achieved by judicial reliance on precedent, thereby
offsetting any retail-level infractions against justice.43 Thus, individual
injustices can be tolerated for corresponding gains in predictability,4 4
stability,4 5 correction of judicial bias,4 6 preservation of private expectations,4 7 limitation of judicial discretion,4 8 or judicial efficiency.49 In
combination, these practical ends serve as a bulwark against devolution to complete societal chaos.o Any number of fundamental legal
principles established in prior cases must be essentially beyond the
bounds of argument in future litigation, for holding otherwise would

42. In the following Section, I turn to the subtly distinct account provided by Ronald Dworkin, which I use as a springboard for my own arguments. See infra Part IV.
43. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (providing a useful example of this approach in the Supreme Court's discussion of the
value of stare decisis).
44. See, e.g., Schauer, Precedent,supra note 8, at 595-96; Benditt, supra note 8, at
91; Gentithes, supra note 8, at 799-808.
45. Peters, supra note 3, at 2039 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 853-68).
46. Sherwin, supra note 37, at 1186.
47. Peters, supra note 3, at 2039.
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 11, at 187 (Alexander Hamilton) ("To
avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be
bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their
duty in every particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be conceived
from the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent
knowledge of them.").
49. See, e.g., Schauer, Precedent,supra note 8, at 599 (citing CARDOZO, supra note
12, at 149-50); Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 76-77; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and The Constitution:An Essay on ConstitutionalMethodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
570, 573 (2001).
50. Fallon, supra note 49, at 584-85.
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lead to "massive destabilization" that could undermine the state's viability." The judiciary must follow a principle of stare decisis at least
robust enough "to prevent disruption of practice and expectations so
settled, or to avoid the revitalization of a public debate so divisive,
that departure from the precedent would contribute in some perceptible way to a failure of confidence in the lawfulness of fundamental
features of the political order." 52
In general, the distinct ends described by these theories are considered conducive to a system that is wholesale more just than it would
otherwise be. That posited relationship is not consistent amongst the
authors of these approaches; in some cases the pragmatic ends are
assigned some normative value in themselves. Perhaps the most that
can be said is that each of these positions suggests reliance on precedent will "serve justice-related ends,"" whether or not these ends
have inherent value or derive their normative worth through their
eventual production of justice. Nonetheless, the variety of theories
directed towards those ends can be usefully grouped together under
the "pragmatic" heading given their common orientation towards an
end distinct from justice itself.5 4 As illustrated below, that orientation
places the ends served by reliance on precedent external to a conception of justice.

SUBSTANTIVE
JUSTICE

Value Derived

Instrumentally

PRGAI
ENDS
No Independent
Value

51. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 750 (1988).
52. Id.
53. Peters, supra note 3, at 2040.
54. In arguing that judicial reasoning by analogy to prior cases produces many of
the ends listed above, Emily Sherwin is careful to emphasize that "these advantages
are indirect." Sherwin, supra note 37, at 1186.
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FormalJustice

An alternative support for a strong theory of precedent is encapsulated by the intuitively appealing doctrine of treating like cases alike.
At its heart, this view suggests that precedent is vital (and perhaps
even logically required)" to achieve consistency in adjudicatory outcomes. There is significant correspondence between this type of consistency and many of the values allegedly supported by the Rule of
Law, such as a sphere of predictable freedoms in which one can order
her private affairs 5 6 or the constancy of the law concerning private
arrangements amongst citizens that will lead to a prosperous society. 7
Some refer to this idea as the requirement of "formal justice,"5 suggesting that it is inexorably tied to a designation of certain institutions
as the means to produce and apply law if the legal system is to hold
any hope for just outcomes.5 9
Treating relevantly similar cases in the same way seems normatively
sound independent of justice simply because that is the fairest treatment possible.6 o This argument is a familiar one to any parent who
(accidentally or intentionally) dotes on only one child, say by giving a
cookie to her son Jack but not to her son John. Regardless of the
substantive justice of giving a cookie to Jack (that is, whether Jack
substantively deserves that cookie given his past behavior or has otherwise merited such a reward), John will inevitably protest that he is
likewise entitled to a cookie as a matter of fairness given the lack of
an apparent distinction between the two children. 6 Proponents of the
like cases alike principle might also argue that similar treatment is a
55. Benditt, supra note 8, at 89 ("[A] decision maker who has decided a kind of
case in accordance with a given principle today logically commits himself to deciding a
similar case tomorrow in accordance with that principle.").
56. See F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 112 (Bruce Caldwell ed., 2007).
57. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 134 (E. Dumont trans.,
1840).
58. I use this term to broadly capture all of the arguments derived from the principle of treating like cases alike, including claims of so-called "comparative justice"
discussed in detail in the following paragraph.
59. Green, supra note 13, at 10-11. The argument for formal justice seems to be
based upon analogical reasoning, although some suggest there is a distinction to be
made between reasoning from precedent and pure analogical reasoning. For instance,
Schauer contends that reasoning from precedent is not the same as reasoning from
analogy because it is not a matter of choosing a subject case for comparison; reasoning from precedent requires reliance upon a previous case simply because it was decided previously, not because it is the best factual analogue available. See SCHAUER,
supra note 4, at 91.
60. See Raleigh Hannah Levine & Russell Panier, Comparative and Noncomparative Justice: Some Guidelinesfor ConstitutionalAdjudication, 14 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 141, 147 (2005) (citing JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 99-100 (1973))
(noting that such arguments are sometimes made in the name of "comparative justice" ultimately designed "to protect comparative rights"). I eschew that label here
simply to avoid confusion.
61. There is of course a flip-side to this principle, which requires "[t]reat[ing] relevantly dissimilar cases in different ways." Id. at 149. For instance, if Jack is older he
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requirement of fairness when two parties raise otherwise identical
claims at different times. Fairness seems to demand that claims that
are identical in all respects other than the time they were raised be
resolved the same way, so long as there is no reason that the timing
itself makes a substantive difference. If a meaningful distinction between the cases is lacking, then it only seems fair that both claimants
receive the same result.
Strong critiques of this approach exist. Although I do not believe
they defeat the intuition at its heart, they demonstrate its limitations.
In common, these critiques suggest that the principle of treating like
cases alike is necessarily distinct from the requirements of substantive
justice more broadly understood. For example, treating future cases
that are similar to past decisions in the same fashion may be a sequentially arbitrary, and hence substantively unjust, approach. "It makes
the rightness or wrongness of a person's treatment contingent upon
the sequence in which that person is treated with respect to other
identically situated people,"6 2 rather than focusing on some concept of
dessert outside of that comparative viewpoint. Stare decisis defined
purely as this type of equality amongst like cases is also potentially
tautological. As commonly formulated, the position amounts to the
claim that "[i]dentically situated people are entitled to be treated
identically." 6 3 As Christopher Peters argues, the phrase "identically
situated people" in the traditional expression of equality becomes
"'people identically entitled to the relevant treatment.' The traditional expression now reads like this: 'people identically entitled to
the relevant treatment are entitled to be treated identically'-that is,
are identically entitled to that treatment. Traditionally expressed,
equality is tautological."6 4 Even if one denies the tautology thesis,
simply insisting that like cases be treated alike gives little guidance to
the judge. "Other principles are required to determine what features
of a case are the relevant ones for determining how the parties are to
be treated, and thus in determining what the relevant similarities and
dissimilarities are." 65
might argue he deserves a later bedtime than younger John based on their dissimilarity in age and (presumably) maturity.
62. Peters, supra note 3, at 2068.
63. Id. at 2057 (emphasis omitted).
64. Id. at 2059 (relying heavily upon PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY

(1990)).
65. Benditt, supra note 8, at 90; see also Levine & Panier, supra note 60, at 147
("The term 'relevantly' in each of the two precepts of comparative justice points to
the need to specify the relevant similarities or dissimilarities in any particular instance
of the precept's application."). Others have pointed to a similar circularity in arguments of "horizontal equity" in the tax policy context. See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham
& Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference,48 TAx L. REv. 319,

361-64 (1993). Peters posits further problems with the idea of equality as a value in
itself, arguing that it is internally incoherent because treating a given actor unjustly in
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Defenses of precedent that require like treatment of like cases thus
seem to rely on a value external to substantive justice, something akin
to equality or fairness, as illustrated below. This external value has its
own normative weight, although it may derive limited additional value
in cases where such equality or fairness supports a substantively just
outcome. However, supporters of this view must admit that, at least
on occasion, treating a particular case like a previous one will dictate
an unjust result, showing the tenuous connection between this external normative value and substantive justice itself. The view therefore
fails to draw a direct connection between precedent and justice, one
which I believe can be drawn given a proper understanding of the
dimensions of a just decision.

Limited

SUBSTANTIVE

Additional
EValue--

FORMAL

JUSTICE

Independent
Normative

Value

I do not mean to discard these two traditional defenses altogether.
They importantly detail how reliance upon precedent promotes equality and fairness. But each begins with an admission that a theory of
precedent necessarily works individual substantive injustices, then fortifies precedent with the other values it serves.6 6 I believe an argument in favor of precedent can be made purely on the grounds of
achieving substantively just results, if one properly understands a just
decision to include a humble approach by its author. This will strike
at the heart of the contentions against precedent made in the name of
justice as an overarching value in a theory of adjudication. I also bea subsequent case is to treat her unequally "with respect to everyone who ever has
been (or ever will be) treated justly." Peters, supra note 3, at 2068.
66. Others claim that the concerns I have labeled "pragmatic" are indeed aiming
at justice on a wholesale level, rather than on a retail case-by-case basis. See Peters,
supra note 3, at 2039-40. While I agree that those theories are primarily concerned
with consequences, I choose not to apply that label to my own theory because it aims
to promote justice directly, rather than a separate end-like stability or efficiency
which will in turn produce justice at a wholesale level.
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lieve it will be a useful supplement to many existing theories of adjudication, specifically the work of Ronald Dworkin, to which I turn
below.

IV. DwORKIN's

INTEGRITY 67

Ronald Dworkin's seminal "law as integrity" theory is an astute
description of what judges and lawyers are up to in litigating cases and
a wonderfully insightful account of most Anglo-American jurisprudes'
understanding of the term "law." His observation that judges and
lawyers seek to integrate various legal ideals, expounding sometimes
into broader policy goals or moral precepts, is descriptively on the
mark. But I think the view lacks sufficient logical justification for the
role precedent can play in appellate courts.. While it suggests that
prior decisions expounding our legal ideals are pivotal, it does not
fully detail why that prior law should be an anchor for a present judicial decision.68
In earlier writing, Dworkin noted the basic fairness inherent in
treating like cases alike. He has argued that because "[a] precedent is
the report of an earlier political decision," its very existence, "as a
piece of political history, provides some reason for deciding other
cases in a similar way in the future." 69 But his later work reveals a far
more subtle account of the role precedent ought to play in adjudication."o For Dworkin, the law at its best seeks a form of "integrity;"
that is, it forces us to reflect upon the requirements of the structure of
the legal system we have slowly assembled as we extend that system
into new areas and eras and decide if changes in that structure are
necessary.7 Integrity, or an internal consistency amongst legal rules,
67. I do not address the role of precedent in positivist theories of jurisprudence in
this Section, although it may be that positivists underestimate the role of precedent
according to the view I adopt. Others, however, have attempted to reconcile
positivism and stare decisis. See Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories of Adjudication and the
Status of Stare Decisis, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 73, 85-86 (Lawrence Goldstein ed.,
1987).
68. There are many similarities between the questions of how much justices should
rely upon precedent and how to structure a well-reasoned philosophical argument.
There is certainly something to be said for relying upon the work of previous thinkers
as a starting point for argument, although at the same time inappropriate reliance on
inapposite authority or argument against a weakened version of authority are both
clear logical fallacies. In many ways, this Article is itself intended as a careful refinement of Ronald Dworkin's law-as-integrity theory, rather than an effort to craft a
legal theory anew. Thus, the Article exemplifies a humble legal theorist approaching
a particular issue within his discipline by seeking to refine existing ideas in a slow
advancement of philosophical doctrine. This example could be considered an aphorism for the approach a judge ought to take in refining abstract legal issues by building with humility upon prior work. The Article argues for a certain analytical position
of which it is itself (hopefully) an example.
69. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 14, at 1090.
70. See Peters, supra note 3, at 2076.
71. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 89-90.
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is thus the ultimate aim of the law.72 The state derives its legitimacy to
utilize coercive power through this internal consistency in its laws."
Grounded in an understanding of community derived from the French
Revolution's rhetorical appeal to "fraternity," Dworkin sees integrity
as the touchstone that gives rise to the state's legitimacy and the political obligations of its citizens." Integrity in the law is therefore essential to the preservation of the state and of the utmost importance in
the work of its judges.
The best way to ensure that the law will develop with integrity is to
create legal rules that match closely with "principles of personal and
political morality."" Applying these views to precedent, Dworkin
seems to recommend that a judge consider more than the reasons present in a particular opinion that support the conclusion. She should
also turn to the best possible principles that would justify the entire
system of precedents (which may or may not be expressed in those
precedents directly)7 6 in an effort to guide the shape of the law and
make it the best it can be.
Precedent as an input for the judge seeking to produce the most just
results is thus given a certain priority, but it is at least initially unclear
how far the priority goes under the integrity theory." Dworkin seems
72. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 13 (2006) [hereinafter Dworkin, JusTICE IN ROBES].
73. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 188 ("A political society that
accepts integrity as a political virtue thereby becomes a special form of community,
special in a way that promotes its moral authority to assume and deploy a monopoly
of coercive force.").
74. Id. at 206-08, 215-16.
75. DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN RoBES, supra note 72, at 14.
76. In earlier work, Dworkin seems to suggest that the principles for which a precedent stands will emerge from consideration of the precedent outside of its language,
not from any particular statement within it. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 14, at
1093. However, when the later judge must construct a scheme of justification for his
decision, Dworkin recommends that the judge should give "initial or prima facie
place" to the propositions the author of a prior case relied upon. Id. at 1096.
77. Dworkin suggests that personal or political moral considerations play a vital
role in how judges interpret the law according to the most consistent principles possible. DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra note 72, at 50 ("Legal reasoning means
bringing to bear on particular discrete legal problems . . . a vast network of principles
of legal derivation or of political morality."); id. at 14 ("A proposition of law is true, I
suggest, if it flows from principles of personal and political morality that provide the
best interpretation of the other propositions of law generally treated as true in contemporary legal practice."). It seems there is limited finality to any given decision, a
possibility Dworkin himself acknowledges. Id. at 118 ("[O]n some occasions overall
constitutional integrity might require a result that could not be justified by, and might
even contradict, the best interpretation of the constitutional text considered apart
from the history of its enforcement."). Dworkin believes that a judge must at least be
cognizant of the potential accusation that the principles she relied on in her decision
have been rejected in earlier decisions. Id. at 52-53. He also notes that our practices
continually evolve to meet our current (and shifting) conception of morality. For instance, our reading of the Eighth Amendment would change if judges assumed that
they must determine what was cruel for people at the time the amendment was enacted under then-prevailing moral visions. Id. at 121, 125-26.
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to suggest that on occasion (and particularly where constitutional
rights are at issue) "there is a standing and great risk to be set against
any reasons there may be for courts postponing recognizing the full
implications of their decisions of principle. That is, the risk of injustice to a great many people until the day of ripeness is reached."" His
conception does not seem to prescribe reliance on precedent as a powerful and meaningful guide to the exercise of judicial discretion, arguing instead that there is little need to cabin judicial discretion and
conceding that precedent is not a useful restraint anyway.
Dworkin's integrity is an ideal distinct from the kind of consistency
that the principle of "like cases alike" is designed to serve; "an institution that accepts [integrity] will sometimes, for that reason, depart
from a narrow line of past decisions in search of fidelity to principles
conceived as more fundamental to the scheme as a whole."" A judge
following law-as-integrity must apparently steel herself to the corresponding dangers of instability and unpredictability, disregarding precedent if necessary to correct violations of current shared
understandings of particular legal values. Such corrections ensure
that the law's internal coherence will sufficiently support the legitimacy of the state's coercive power. Precedent's priority in establishing that coherence, if any, is limited.
Lacking from Dworkin's theory, then, is a genuine suggestion that
relying on precedent will engender more just or reasonable results,
that part of what makes a decision just is that very reliance. He would
likely argue that the views of current judges must remain plausible
accounts that integrates smoothly with our legal traditions, including
the opinions of the judges that have passed previously.o But by making integrity itself the goal, this view gives precedent priority only because of its previous existence, not because justice requires reliance
upon it in judicial opinions. Breaks from the reasoning in a previous
line of cases are actually somewhat desirable, making integrity "a
more dynamic and radical standard than it first seemed," one that
''encourages a judge to be wide-ranging and imaginative in his search
78. Id. at 138.
79. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 219.
80. DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES supra note 72, at 118 ("Proper constitutional
interpretation takes both text and past practice as its object: lawyers and judges faced
with a contemporary constitutional issue must try to construct a coherent, principled,
and persuasive interpretation of the text of particular clauses, the structure of the
Constitution as a whole, and our history under the Constitution-an interpretation
that both unifies these distinct sources, so far as this is possible, and directs future
adjudication."). A justice cannot simply state her own original views in an opinion,
but must express a viewpoint on what the justice's broader ideals point to, a viewpoint
which itself will be a controversial interpretation of prior decisions on the point of law
at issue. Id. at 12 ("A useful theory of an interpretive concept [such as justice] must
itself be an interpretation, which is very likely to be controversial, of the practice in
which the concept figures.").
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for coherence with fundamental principle.""1 A precedent is simply
one of several inputs from which a judge derives the broader principles of law, 8 2 not a necessary component of a just decision."
Dworkin thus draws a distinction between the values of integrity
and justice. He may fail in this project, however, as Professor Peters
contends. On Peters's account, Dworkin's arguments for integrity distill into a strategy to reach more just results, much in the same way
that some pragmatic theories suggest a judge should rely heavily on
precedent to attain other ends that will produce a more just system
overall.8 4 Peters denies Dworkin's claim that we would be abhorred
by a "checkerboard" statute, such as one permitting abortion only for
women born in odd-numbered years because the statute fails to correspond to an ideal of "integrity" external to justice.8 5 Rather, our con81. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 220.
82. Peters, supra note 3, at 2074 ("Under law as integrity, judicial precedent is
among the data upon which a judge must rely in interpreting 'our present system of
public standards' and extracting the principles she will apply in a difficult case. Previous judicial decisions may have articulated some of the principles the judge is attempting to discover in holistically interpreting the legal system. To the extent that
the principles discovered by the judge and applicable to the case before her have been
articulated by prior decisions, the judge, who is bound to follow those principles, must
'adhere' to those prior decisions.") (quoting DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 23,
at 217-18)).
83. There may be some question as to whether Dworkin's position provides cover
for the direct injection of policy preferences into judicial opinions. Even a judge that
candidly enacts her policy preferences must have formed some basis for deciding on
those as her preferences, likely through a review of broader legal principles similar to,
although perhaps less rigorous than, that called for by integrity. That judge could
then put those principles into practice by using the policy preferences she derived to
guide her decisions. Thus, a judge that rules based upon policy preferences is engaging in at least the same class of activity as a judge following the principles dictated by
integrity as far as possible and even candidly incorporating philosophical or moral
judgment into divining the appropriate legal precepts to apply in a given case (although perhaps the former is guilty of more self-deception). When one says that she
is following a particular course "because it is good public policy," often she has simply
added superfluous language to the statement that she followed that course "because it
is good."
The potential for such injection of "policy preferences" may be especially acute in
the case of a nation's highest court, where cases are more likely to reach the level of
ultimate moral judgments under Dworkin's law-as-integrity method, than in lower
and intermediate courts, where decisions are more likely to be guided by higher-court
pronouncements on legal issues at least related to the present case. The lower court
may find an important aspect of the integrity of the system requires it to respect prior
decisions and allow an appeal up the hierarchy. The highest court in a jurisdiction will
be far less limited, and indeed far less likely to utilize the opinions of lower courts in
administering an integrated legal system from the top down. These courts will not be
so reluctant to look to greater spheres of judicial principles, perhaps even beyond
their own decisions because the degree to which they are bound by their own previous
decisions is unclear and, in any event, certainly less than the degree to which lower
courts are bound by those very same opinions.
84. Peters, supra note 3, at 2090.
85. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 178-86. For an excellent summary
of Dworkin's views on checkerboard statutes, see Peters, supra note 3, at 2088-89.
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cern arises from the fact that the checkerboard statute treats people
according to both of two logically inconsistent principles, only one of
which could conceivably be just. Such schemes are offensive because
they will always necessarily work some injustice through the application of the wrong principle. 86 Integrity, then, may be nothing more
than an instrumental means of achieving justice. Thus, while Dworkin
contends that integrity is an ideal of independent normative value, it
may in fact be more akin to a pragmatic end described earlier, and
hence may fit in either category illustrated previously.

SUBSTANTIVE
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This criticism of Dworkin's view rests on integrity's alleged value

independent of justice. While I do not take a stance on that issue here
(or integrity's importance in establishing political legitimacy), I emphasize that integrity's relationship to precedent allows space for
strong reliance upon prior cases as an internal aspect of justice. His
view neither wholly prescribes reliance on precedent nor makes such

86. Peters, supra note 3, at 2101-02 ("We know by definition that such schemes
require treatment of every person subject to them according to a morally incorrect
principle. Again, the inconsistency embodied in the checkerboard scheme matters
only because it flags the fact that one of the reasons being applied to every person's
treatment under the scheme must be irrelevant. The fact of inconsistency underscores
the fact of injustice."). See also Benditt, supra note 8, at 90 (making a similar argument about claims of formal justice in general, noting that the principle that like cases
are to be treated alike "implies only that if two relevantly similar cases are treated
differently, then one of them is in error and some party has been treated unfairly,
though the principle doesn't say which").
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reliance a value internal to integrity." A judge convinced by the reasoning of a previous case is simply learning from its content, not relying upon it strongly because it represents the work of prior judges."
Under Dworkin's approach, applying that precedent is helpful insofar
as it promotes the integrity of the law, but applying precedent is not a
requirement of integrity in all cases nor is it a requirement of the allegedly distinct ideal of justice.
In developing my own theory, I do not mean to promote precedent
simply on the basis of status-purely favoring the reasoning of a case
because of its priority in time would circularly rely upon the policy
preferences or perhaps more carefully refined philosophies of prior
judges. Instead, I want to sketch a more direct link between the use of
precedent and justice than Dworkin has given us without necessarily
excluding his argument that integrity can act as a source of state legitimacy. Insofar as his theory leaves precedent external to the ideal of
integrity, those persuaded by his view remain free to regard reliance
on precedent as an aspect internal to justice, regardless of whether
integrity is an important and distinct aim of the state.
V.

PRECEDENT, HUMILITY, AND JUSTICE

Precedent should fit within a conception of justice as a constituent
part of another aspect of a just decision, humility. Only when taking a
humble approach to the case at bar and relying on the opinions of the
myriad judges that have passed before her can the present judge
render a just decision, one which strikes the proper balance between
social ideals and social cohesion. Precedent will be the primary guide
in her exercise of discretion, given a special priority over other interpretive sources.
The early development of first amendment jurisprudence regarding
content-based speech regulations provides a useful example of the
balance between the ideal and the pragmatic present in any just decision. The broad constitutional restraint on congressional acts "abridging the freedom of speech" provided little guidance to the Supreme
Court in early First Amendment cases.8 9 The modern conception of
that free speech ideal evolved incrementally through reliance upon
precedent as judges only applied limited extensions of the reasoning
87. Dworkin argues that, in some cases, precedent and justice will pull in opposite
directions, and in those cases justice should be favored. DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES,
supra note 72, at 138.
88. As noted earlier, Dworkin allows that prior decisions may have stated the
broader principle of law that guides decisions in a given legal area, but suggests only
that they must be checked to confirm or deny this possibility. Peters, supra note 3, at
2074 (quoting DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, Supra note 23, at 217-18). This may not
constitute genuine reliance upon precedent, which as Frederick Schauer contends may
be independent of the precedent's content. SCHAUER, supra note 4, at 62.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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in any one case. 90 "The story of the emergence of the American constitutional law of free speech is a story of evolution and precedent."9 1
Early cases arose in the context of particularly heightened social
alarm in the World War I era; Congress responded with several statutes punishing agitation against the war or military service.9 2 Initial
efforts to limit the scope of those statutes, such as Learned Hand's
narrow understanding of speech that may "cause" insubordination, 93
were disfavored by the public and rejected by the Court. Instead, the
Court followed the path charted by Oliver Wendell Holmes in the
Schenck case, finding broad Congressional authority to regulate words
that are "used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 94
While this standard was initially permissive of significant contentbased regulation, it logically implies that congressional authority is actually quite limited unless the regulated speech creates an immediate
and significant threat. Holmes himself was clearly aware of the implication; in a dissent in Abrams published shortly after Schenck, Holmes
expounded the clear and present danger test, arguing that "[i]t is only
the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that
warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion." 9 5
Relying on the analytical principle of his prior opinion, Holmes's dissent more thoroughly developed the logical implications of the clear
and present danger test to limit Congressional regulation unless the
risk of serious harm was likely and immediate.9 6 Although it was not
adopted by the Court at the time, "this understanding of clear and
present danger-with many variations and refinements over timehas become a core principle of First Amendment law.""
Development of Supreme Court doctrine in the area took its next
turn during the Cold War era. As the fear of communism washed
90. STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 62. Much of my discussion of free speech builds
upon Strauss's work.
91. Id. at 53 ("The central features of First Amendment law were hammered out
in fits and starts, in a series of judicial decisions and extrajudicial developments, over
the course of the twentieth century.").
92. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 20 (Aspen Publishers,
3rd ed. 2008).
93. Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) ("If one stops
short of urging upon others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law, it
seems to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation.").
94. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
95. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). At a minimum, this meant that "Congress certainly cannot forbid
all effort to change the mind of the country." Id.
96. STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 64.
97. Id. Other members of the Court at first resisted this full application of the
principle, which Holmes continued to preach, along with Justice Brandeis, in dissent.
See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253, 272-73 (1920); Schaefer v. United
States, 251 U.S. 466, 482, 494-95 (1920).
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over Congress, legislators again attempted to regulate dissident
speech. In Dennis the Court once more found such regulations constitutional,98 but this time significant social criticism of the decision indicated a broad shift in the public's understanding of the free speech
ideal that paralleled Holmes's dissenting explications of "clear and
present danger."9 9 This shift viewed the Court's prior jurisprudence
in the area as an overreaction to the destabilizing potential of dissenting speech."o The change in social understanding gave the Court the
needed leeway to fully apply the logical extension of Holmes's analytical principles and take a far more speech-protective stance in the
1960s. In Brandenburg, the Court struck as unconstitutional a 1919
Ohio statute regulating the advocacy of crime or violence as a means
of political reform. 101 The Court relied on an interpretation of the
free speech ideal akin to the imminent and likely harm understanding
that Holmes (and Brandeis) had earlier advocated.1 02 Accepting the
full implication of Holmes's clear and present danger test from prior
cases, the Court held that "the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action."'
Certainly, no single conception of the ideal of free speech carries
the day, and its value remains subject to frequent debate covering a
wide variety of theories.' 04 But the early evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence regarding content-based regulation demonstrates
that public debate over the ideal has followed a cautious judicial expansion of its limits. This has not been a story of any one judge apply98. In Dennis, the Court interpreted the clear and present danger analysis as a
balance between " 'the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improbability' " and "
'such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' " Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212
(1950)).
99. STRAUSs, supra note 18, at 71 ("In the years after Dennis, the clear-and-present-danger test, so dominant in the early 1940s, came under attack from many
sides.").
100. Id. at 67 ("Beginning with the Russian Revolution and World War I and continuing into the 1920s, popular and government reaction to dissidents was overwrought and panic-stricken; by the 1930s, that panic had abated . . . [B]y the end of
the 1930s, the free speech edifice (to use Burke's term) no longer consisted of just the
post-World War I decisions; there were now a number of cases upholding speakers'
claims, and there was a trend, however incompletely rationalized, toward protecting
speech.").
101. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam).
102. STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 72 ("Brandenburg does not use the phrase 'clear
and present danger,' but the Court's emphasis on imminence and likelihood of harm
was derived directly from the Holmes and Brandeis version of the clear-and-presentdanger test.").
103. Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447.
104. For background on the various justificatory theories at play, see STONE ET AL.,
supra note 92, at 8-16.
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ing wholesale a particularly vibrant new conception. Over time,
judges instead slowly applied the full extension of a previously announced analytical principle to expand the meaning of the underlying
free speech ideal, all the while hewing closely to the pace of shifting
social understandings.
These cases demonstrate that reliance on precedent is needed to
achieve two equally important functions of adjudication: the formation of a cohesive social structure and the advancement of societal
ideals. Despite the constant tension between these primary functions,
neither can be sacrificed in the name of the other. The balance between them is essential-arguments that decisions maintaining that
balance work an injustice on a retail level fail to perceive that justice
in adjudication consists at least partially in that very balance and cannot be described at such a micro level without regard to the broader
macro-level definition of the principle. Decisions that adhere to this
balance by considering precedent and ensuring that our ideals are not
largely cast aside by a wary populace do not constitute individual
injustices.
This claim should not be taken as an attempt to wholly define justice, a project far beyond this Article. I focus here only on the compromised nature of justice when considered in a particular sense
applicable to adjudication. Whatever else justice might contain, one
of its components is the needed balance of which judges must be
mindful when rendering a decision, as many judges were during the
early development of first amendment doctrine. 0 5 Justice may not be
only this balance, but in the context of adjudication, it is at a minimum
partly defined by it.

When a judge decides a particular case by explicating the full logical
extension of any social ideal without regard for social cohesion, she
fails to acknowledge that a just adjudicatory outcome requires a carefully-attuned equilibrium between principle and practicality. Just adjudication accepts a compromise between social reality and social
ideals. A particular legal principle may have clear repercussions, but
judges hoping to uphold or refine the ideal behind that principle may
need to implement that ideal incrementally. Given the judiciary's institutional role, 1 0 6 judges must be willing to humbly temper their views
in favor of a more circumscribed implementation of a newly-defined
right or recently-clarified principle, making justice in this context a
105. For a summation of the similar development of other aspects of First Amendment doctrine, see STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 51-76.
106. It seems clear that judges are at least somewhat institutionally constrained
given their place in society. Scorr J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 326 (2011) ("Judges must
explain their rulings to the public and are usually subject to some review, whether by
a higher court, legislature, or future constitutional convention. Courts are, therefore,
constrained in their behavior: they cannot simply offer any interpretation they wish,
but only those that will preserve their professional reputations and survive on
appeal.").
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guide to compromise amongst ideals rather than an ideal which itself
dictates specific results. A just decision cannot abstract from the surrounding social and political environment in assigning burdens and
benefits; it must to some degree account for the existing status quo
even if it starts society down the path towards the fuller embodiment
of a particular ideal.
This does not mean that judges must uphold or create a checkerboard-style weigh-station in the path to a more complete resolution of
a particular controversy. As Dworkin would likely argue, such checkerboard outcomes might undermine the state's legitimacy and lead to
its dissolution or at least degradation around the edges of its power.
However, the competing functions of adjudication often require
judges to temper their efforts to reach intuitively towards a more
"perfect" outcome regardless of how far that departs from the status
quo. While avowed inconsistency within any particular conception of
a societal ideal should be avoided, somewhat limited extensions of
that ideal may be desirable. Surely, incremental implementation of a
refined ideal based on a nuanced analytical framework is more just
than immediate and full implementation of its implications that leads
citizens to question their obligation to submit to the coercive enforcement and judicial interpretation of the law.
Ideals, of course, are not to be discarded for the sake of political
convenience. Judges cannot stand beholden to political pressures in
rendering decisions without at least seeking to further refine any given
line of precedent. But they can navigate competing concerns about
the social limitations of a decision and the perhaps radical outcomes
that follow from its reasoning. The task is demanding and complex,
requiring ongoing development of ideals coupled with an understating
of the extent to which those ideals can fully be put into practice in the
modern context.
The difficulty of the task implies the need for adjudicative humility
and reverence for past resolutions of similar problems, rather than a
conception of judicial philosopher-kings somehow divining the right
balance. A judge should not use adjudication's complexity as a shield
to deflect criticism or dismiss any argument she does not find immediately persuasive. Instead, complexity requires humble consideration
of arguments and approaches found in prior decisions. Failure to
maintain such humility either by imposing a radical vision of our basic
ideals or, at the other extreme, refusing to refine those ideals in any
way that threatens the status quo, may presage the downfall of the
social order. Ultimately, we cannot ask judges to simply do what they
think best without regard to their political environment nor should we
expect them to rule only in line with practical political considerations.
Instead, judges must take an approach that both humbly acknowledges the faults in the existing schema of legal principles and proposes
carefully delineated advancements of our legal structure after genu-
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ine, thorough consideration of prior precedents. Judicial humility is
the linchpin, ensuring that each new generation of judges can pursue
the long-term refinement of legal principles without unwarranted, destabilizing reinvention of the whole legal landscape.'o
Thus conceived, humility is neither an independent normative value
(similar to the value of treating like cases alike) nor a mere external
instrument for the production of just results (similar to the ends posited in traditional pragmatic defenses of precedent). Humility ought
to be understood in a way that makes its relationship with a just decision much more direct. It is in part constitutive of such a just decision,
and therefore is an inherent aspect of the normative value of justice
itself, rather than something external.

SUBSTANTIVE

Limited
Additional

JUSTICE

Value

FORMAL
JUSTICE
-

Independent

Normative
Value
(Integrity?)

HUMILITYt

Value Derived
Instrumentally

PRGAI
ENDS
No Independent
Value
(Integrity?)

By bringing a humble attitude to her decisions, a judge can ensure just
results. After all, "the integrity each judge must seek is the integrity
107. Humility is thus an important method of ensuring that judges will temper their
exercises of discretion to some degree. Others have suggested that judges ought to
defer to their place in the legal system established by the country's framers and exercise less discretion if it is clear that those planners did not find judges particularly
trustworthy. Id. at 345. While my account is not necessarily inconsistent with such
considerations, it largely relies upon respect for the efforts of prior judges represented
by the body of existing precedent to restrain discretion. As I argue later in the Article, even judges seeking to dramatically alter the legal landscape will be motivated to
largely adhere to precedent to ensure that any alterations they propose are likewise
upheld by future generations of judges. See infra Part IX; Eric Rasmusen, Judicial
Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 63, 67 (1994) (arguing that
judges seeking to implement their policy preferences have an incentive to adhere to
precedent in their opinions).
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of the law over time. That is a collective project, and a judge's interpretation of the law at any point in time must recognize this.""os
Humility is itself constituted by reliance on precedent. A judge
must make a humble effort to incorporate the body of prior decisions
if she is to render a just outcome in any given case, even utilizing those
precedents at the thick level of analytical principle. 109 Precedent allows judges to utilize existing analytical structures to ensure a smooth
transition to clearer understandings of society's basic commitments.
As Holmes did in the early First Amendment context, judges can set
out the tests that will dictate future extensions of a partially-specified
ideal but stay enforcement until the populace can readjust and citizens
have the time to consider and accept the new specification as accurate.
Reliance on precedent ensures that existing analytical frameworks derived from traditional understandings of our legal principles will be
applied and only cautiously altered, allowing a judge to cross-generationally refine the law and to functionally resolve disputes in the present on a panel-based court. 110 Rather than frequently exercising her
discretion to construct legal analysis from whole cloth, the appellate
judge should take a humble approach with a broad respect for precedent to ensure just decisions.
In the remainder of the Article, I therefore argue that humility requires reliance on precedent in two ways, which I refer to as the horizontal and cross-generational dimensions of precedent. These uses of
precedent are themselves internal aspects of humility, so that they are
situated within it and, by extension, within the proper understanding
of substantive justice in an adjudicatory context.

SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE

HUMILITY
Cross-

G nerational
Dimension

Horizontal
Dimension
ofrcdn
o rcdn

of; eedent

108. Gerald J. Postema, "Protestant" Interpretation and Social Practices, 6 L. &
PHIL. 283, 312 (1.987).

109. See infra Part VI.

110. David Strauss argues that justices should approach constitutional cases, as a
subspecies of the common law, with the dual attitudes of "humility and cautious empiricism." STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 40. I discuss this view in more detail in considering the cross-generational dimension of judicial humility. See infra Part VII.
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This is not to say that these two aspects of humility exhaust the field.
In statutory cases, for instance, humility might entail some measure of
deference to the legislature, especially if that legislature is empowered
to overrule a judicial opinion statutorily. In a different context, Professor Michael McConnell highlights the absence of just this sort of
humility in Dworkin's theory of adjudication."' Such deference can
act as a meaningful constraint on judicial discretion; however, those
issues are beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses specifically
on the appropriate role of precedent cases in appellate court

opinions.1 12
The following Parts dissect those particular dimensions of humility
that are relevant for appellate adjudication. While the objection to
precedent rejects it as a primary guide to a judge's exercise of discretion within discursive adjudication, I argue that precedent restricts judicial discussion with both contemporaries and predecessors to a
needed common ground, allowing a judge to tentatively define legal
principles and continually refine those guiding understandings at a socially palatable pace.
VI.

THE HORIZONTAL DIMENSION OF PRECEDENT

Consider two of the defining structural elements of the Supreme
Court of the United States. First, although the justices receive lifetime
appointments, the body is sequential rather than unitary; the makeup
of the Court changes over time.11 3 No single adjudicator will persist in
perpetuity to resolve cases in the most consistent manner possible. Instead, justices are tasked with building upon the work of prior judges
with whom they have had no personal interaction. The project is further strained by the second structural element, the Court's panel nature.114 An individual justice must try to reach agreement with a
rotating set of colleagues, each of whom has been appointed, at least
in part, because of her reputation for intellectual aptitude. Even tentative consensus on any issue amongst such a strongly-opinionated
bench is unstable and often fleeting. In that environment, a justice
111. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "MoralReading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1269, 1274 (1997) (noting that, for Dworkin, "[i]t does not seem to matter, one
way or the other, that the legislature has passed a law. The legislative judgment, far
from being entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, is formally irrelevant.").
McConnell includes tradition and earlier cases as constraints to judicial discretion but
adds that the humble judge must also acknowledge and respect "the Framers of the
Constitution ... the representatives of the people [and] the decentralized contributors
to longstanding practice." Id. at 1292.
112. Indeed, if my own conception of humility's relationship to justice proves persuasive, the value of humility may include these other elements by implication as constitutive components of a just judicial opinion.
113. See Kornhauser,supra note 12, at 67 (discussing different possible models of a
court).
114. See id. at 67-68.
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must act humbly and recognize the necessity of establishing a working
relationship with her colleagues in order to resolve properly the extraordinarily divisive controversies on the docket.' 15
The collegial structure of most appellate courts, of which the Supreme Court is emblematic, is an aspect of adjudication that Dworkin
largely ignores, and one which he arguably does not support.' 16
Dworkin contends that "[t]he adjudicative principle of integrity instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on
the assumption that they were all created by a single author-the
community personified-expressing a coherent conception of justice
and fairness.""' Dworkin thus seems to at least prefer the fiction of
singular authorship on a court, a fiction he perpetuates when describing his singular model adjudicator, Hercules. To the extent that judges
must temper their own views in the real world, Dworkin seems opposed to the practice:
An actual [judge] must sometimes adjust what he believes to be
right as a matter of principle, and therefore as a matter of law, in
order to gain the votes of other [judges] and to make their joint
decision sufficiently acceptable to the community so that it can continue to act in the spirit of a community of principle .

.

. We use

Hercules to abstract from these practical issues, as any sound analysis must, so that we can see the compromises actual justices think
necessary as compromises with law.
Dworkin's instincts on this issue, though understandable, are ultimately misguided. Panel judging, a reality in today's appellate courts
and a defining aspect of the Supreme Court of the United States, need
not be dismissed as undesirable under Dworkin's law-as-integrity
framework. Working within a panel promotes humility and, in turn,
enhances the crafting of opinions. Panels require individual judges to
acknowledge broader intellectual concerns generated by their peers
and to attempt to argue persuasively with one another while resolving
115. Gerald Postema expands eloquently on this idea to explain how judges must
work not only with one another, but also with other contemporary actors within the
legal system. "For the judge carries on her interpretive activity simultaneously with
many other judges, lawyers, other officials, and lay persons. Interpretive interaction
extends both diachronically and synchronically. Judges undertake to decide what the
law is by interpreting the practice of other judges, but that practice includes not only
their decisions and actions, but also their interpretive activity. And her interpreting
likewise will fall within the scope of their concern." Postema, supra note 108, at 312.
116. Dworkin is careful to note that his analysis in Law's Empire avoids the issue of
practical compromises judges must sometimes make, "stating the law in a somewhat
different way than they think most accurate in order to attract the votes of other
judges." DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 12. Nonetheless, Dworkin's attitude towards this sort of judicial horse-trading is evident in later passages. See id. at
380-81.
117. Id. at 225.
118. Id. at 380-81.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

27

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 18 [2022], Iss. 4, Art. 9

862

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

difficult problems of interpretation.1 19 They are forced to interact
humbly with one another in reaching a consensus. Utilizing that very
process, the humble judge can produce the most just decision possible.
Of course, outright horse-trading on matters of principle may not be
a desirable judicial tactic. As Jeremy Waldron highlights, "[w]e already have institutions in our political life that are characterized by
compromises, deals, log-rolling, and strategic thinking . . . Don't we

value the power of the judiciary (if we do) because it operates differently from a legislature?"1 20 It seems fairly clear that adjudication
should not require decisions based entirely upon a trade of one
judge's vote in the present case for another judge's vote in a future
one. But at the same time, a judge should be humble enough to approach cases with an open mind and seek some common ground for
the discussion amongst colleagues, a ground that precedent can provide. To again borrow Waldron's language, "[t]he Supreme Court is a
collegial institution and justices of different personalities and ideologies have to get along well enough to transact its business."1 2 1 And
often, the principles and approaches to a given controversy are right
at the heart of the logjam on such high appellate courts.1 22 While outright vote-trading at the expense of any consistency in principle or
well-conceived conception of social ideals is unseemly, when broadly
similar issues arise repeatedly and at least a framework for resolution
has been hammered out in previous decisions, the various judges on
an appellate court should humbly begin their analysis on that common
footing. A judge should work within that framework and remain willing to take account of other judges' views in ways that might ultimately change her own opinions on matters of principle.' 2 3
The role precedent must play in promoting this kind of agreeable
panel adjudication becomes clear upon consideration of the first of
Dworkin's three stages of interpretation of a social practice, the preinterpretive stage. At that stage, "the rules and standards taken to
provide the tentative content of the practice are identified."12 4 This
underlying agreement is vital to the interpretive project: "the interpre119. STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 41 ("It is a bad idea to try to resolve a problem on
your own, without referring to the collective wisdom of other people who have tried
to solve the same problem.").
120. Jeremy Waldron, Temperamental Justice, N.Y. REV. BOOKs, May 10, 2007,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/may/10/temperamental-justice/.
121. Id.
122. Waldron later adds that, as a judge, "you have to be aware that your colleagues-reasonable men and women like you-have come up with different principles, different ways of approaching these assignments. They think your principles are
as wrongheaded as you think theirs are; and you can't both be right." Id.
123. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has frequently remarked, Supreme Court
Justices must learn to "disagree agreeably" for the Court to remain functional. See,
e.g., Kate Shipley, Sandra Day O'Connor at KU Law, KLFP.ORG (April 13, 2010),
http://klfp.org/2010/04/sandra-day-oconnor-at-ku-law/.
124. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE supra note 23, at 65-66.
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tive attitude cannot survive unless members of the same interpretive
community share at least roughly the same assumptions about [the
raw data of interpretation]."1 2 But Dworkin provides scant argument
for the likelihood of such broad agreement at the pre-interpretive
stage, especially on the Supreme Court. He simply points out that
a very great deal of consensus is needed-perhaps an interpretive
community is usefully defined as requiring consensus at this stageif the interpretive attitude is to be fruitful, and we may therefore
abstract from this stage in our analysis by presupposing that the
classifications it ields are treated as given in day-to-day reflection
and argument.
While that abstraction may be a given regarding day-to-day matters, it
is far from intuitive in matters of more controversial interpretation on
a high appellate court. In those cases, the pre-interpretive stage is
vital both for defining the playing field and for determining the analytical starting point for the judges.' 2 7 The Supreme Court's fractured
decision in Employment Division v. Smith well illustrates the role precedent can play.' 2 8 While the majority held that the strict scrutiny
balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner did not apply to claims
for a religious exemption from generally applicable criminal laws,' 2 9
the concurrence and dissent argued stridently that strict scrutiny was
the proper analytical framework dictated by precedent cases."'o The
resulting decision was a disjointed series of analyses jumping off from
various points in prior doctrine and mostly debating at cross-purposes.
More robust reliance on the precedents at hand might have allowed
the justices to analyze the issue on a common ground in reaching their
ultimate conclusions.
The case also shows that ambiguities in past decisions can be valuable for present judicial authors; when approached humbly, such ambiguities force modern contemporaries to work together to find the
meaning of prior cases before they set out to construct a resolution to
a particularly puzzling issue, ensuring that judges avoid simply talking
past each other. "Our past practice bears the shape of our common
life, while at the same time forcing us to address together the question
just what this shape is, and what it means for our collective and indiThe rule or principle an earvidual actions now and in the future."'
125. Id. at 67; see also Postema, supra note 108, at 297-98.
126. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 66.
127. As Gerald Postema points out, Dworkin's theory "presupposes that the object
of the competing interpretations can be identified independently of any interpretation." Postema, supra note 108, at 306.
128. See Emp't Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
129. Id. at 883-85.
130. Id. at 892-903 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 907-09 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
131. Gerald J. Postema, On the Moral Presence of Our Past, 36 McGILL L. J. 1153,
1170 (1991) [hereinafter Postema, Moral Presence] ("In my view, it is not the already
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lier case establishes is often highly contentious itself.13 2 But insofar as
judges agree on the applicable precedents and move from that point
to a discussion of what those precedents require in both outcome-determinative and analytical ways, precedent has served its purpose.
Such debate is a component of a reasoned legal discussion; all the
judges will approach a particular issue with the understanding that
certain foundations are not in play but instead define the boundaries
of discourse.
Precedent, then, plays dual roles for a court even at this pre-interpretive stage: it can guide outcomes and can establish a legitimate basis for discussion of abstract principles."' The outcome-determinative
level of precedent, where a past decision allows a certain type of plaintiff or defendant to consistently win cases, is the focus for those touting a thin, consequentialist form of stare decisis. This form of stare
decisis looks only to conclusions, considering whether citizens in a
given situation can expect to have the law on their side. But what
drives those outcomes (perhaps behind the scenes in closely analogous
but factually distinct cases) is an analytical-framework level of precedent that plays a role in a thicker version of stare decisis. This analytical framework concerns the intellectual labor of past opinions'
authors, rather than the outcome that by happenstance favors business interests, the impoverished, and so on. The thicker level of stare
decisis more fully implicates respect for precedent because it requires
respect for the format of discussion and analysis in a particular line of
decisions, even if the outcomes have been somewhat inconsistent
leading up to the most recent case.13 4 At this level of analytical strucdetermined character of the past that renders it fit for our allegiance, but, paradoxically, its very elusiveness. . . . In short, we are bound to keep faith with our past because that is a way of keeping faith with each other."). For this reason, precedent
might be thought to play a special role in the discourse amongst appellate judges. See
id. at 1175 ("For us, shared experience yields a common past with a common significance because it engenders, and is further enriched by, common perception and common discourse.") (citing ARISTOTLE, EUDEMIAN ETHICS, 1244b24-26 (c. 384 B.C.E.);
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICs, 1170b11-12 (c. 384-322 B.C.E.)).
132. Dworkin usefully highlights this issue. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note
14, at 1089.
133. Though discussing the issue of broader societal agreement rather than agreement amongst a judicial panel, Hume also pointed to the role that prior cases can play
in resolving widespread dissensus. Hume argued in part that "the task of rules of
justice (and law) is 'to cut off all occasions for discord and contention', i.e. to define a
framework for co-ordination of social interactions regarding matters on which there
still may be wide dissensus on the merits." Gerald J. Postema, Some Roots of our
Notion of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAw 9, 27 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987)
(emphasis in original) (citing DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 502
(ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2nd ed. rev. P. H. Nidditch 1978)).
134. Dworkin seems to support only the thin version of stare decisis, suggesting
that adherence to the outcome of close cases is more important than adopting the
underlying reasoning supporting those judgments. Dworkin notes a distinction between "the actual decisions that the courts of [the] state reached in the past [and] the
opinions that the judges who decided those cases wrote to support their decisions,"
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ture, precedent plays a crucial role in the collegial resolution of disputes on a judicial panel, restraining the discussion judges have with
one another in a way needed to achieve a just result.1 35
Strong reliance on precedent is therefore pivotal to establish a starting point for debate between an appellate court's members if ultimate
consensus at a later, post-interpretive stage will ever be reached. By
focusing not just on the outcomes of precedent cases but utilizing the
reasoning structure of a previous decision as an agreed starting point
for analysis of ephemeral concepts, judges will be forced to establish
common terms of debate. Precedent is the best means to resolve disputes in a body with an enumerated, rotating membership. Only if the
judges humbly acknowledge the analyses detailed in prior decisions
will they be able to frame their debates in the same terms, that is,
within the analytical structure of those prior decisions.1 36

Modern American lawyers are rightfully obsessed with the validity
of the cases they will cite in an argument before the court. The emand claims to be concerned primarily with "how the community [i.e. judges] actually
uses its power to intervene in citizens' lives, not . . . the reasons that different officials
have given for such intervention in the past." DwORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES, supra
note 72, at 16. He thereby suggests that the structure of analysis in an opinion is far
less important to the future decisions of judges than the ultimate outcome reached.
That at least opens the possibility for future decisions which "cohere" with prior ones
in that they reach similar outcomes, but subtly reject the analysis and reasoning inherent in those prior decisions, a practice I address in Part X.
135. Reliance on precedent may also allow judges on parallel appellate courts to
rely on one another's particular expertise in a given legal field and resolve disputes
more efficiently. Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of
Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 103 (1989) ("Stare decisis may be viewed as a
legal innovation that allows judges to expand the process of trading experience and
expertise over time and across jurisdictions.").
136. Admittedly, if a large part of precedent's value is its utility in resolving disputes amongst a panel of appellate judges, the question remains why we should support a panel-based system of appellate adjudication in the first place. Although I do
not wish to develop an entire theory of judicial review here, I briefly reiterate the
value humility has amongst our most powerful adjudicators and the role humility
plays in ensuring just case-by-case outcomes. The panel nature of adjudication seems
to require judges to exploit each others' thinking capacities in reasoning through a
common analysis. They must emphasize carefully considered, incremental change in
our legal landscape. That process itself is constitutive of, rather than a deviation from,
a just decision.
One might argue that leaving these issues to be resolved by an elected body with
broad membership would be a preferable means of ensuring careful debate and compromise amongst well-qualified thinkers. But a reasonably small panel of adjudicators may be more adept to work on a case-by-case basis to consider how broad
legislative policies have affected actual citizens. In the interest of determinacy, a
panel-based court can resolve individual controversies and cautiously change the legal
landscape without itself orienting towards a particular policy goal. See STRAUSS,
supra note 18, at 40-42 (sounding this note of cautious empiricism). The panel-based
court may itself be required to avoid complete stagnation in the face of difficult cases,
and it in turn will consider some well-informed opposing opinions.
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blem of this hyper-sensitivity is the small red flag visible on the corner
of the page of a case viewed on the Westlaw database, which indicates
negative treatment by a prior court. Practitioners on both sides of a
controversy look for the little red flag because they seek a common
analytical ground in their presentations to the court. Neither party
wishes to completely disregard their opponents' arguments; each
wishes to hold the debate on common terms, anticipating and defeating the opponents claims along the way. In those cases where the
common starting ground is itself the main controversy of the case,
again the little red flag presages the terms of the debate that will ensue. It demonstrates that there is a precedent of debatable value pertinent to the case, the validity of which each side will most likely want
to confront in their arguments.
Much of this Section invites judges on appellate courts to think similarly, which in turn will reinforce such humble, precedent-centered
arguments from the attorneys appearing before them.13 1 Proceeding
logically from the same starting ground makes it possible for a panel
of judges to write a just decision. It provides the avenue through
which remarkably-talented and highly-opinionated adjudicators can
constructively and cooperatively apply their skills, guiding their discretion in a present controversy. By using the analytical structure of
prior cases as the common point of departure for their views, judges
are able to produce just results in the multitude of complex cases
before them.
VII.

CROSS-GENERATIONAL REFINEMENT AND THE CHAIN NOVEL

Humanity is no stranger to ambitious undertakings the scale of
which appear insurmountable in the abstract. A linear series of battlements extending across vast areas of northern China, the Great
Wall is as much a testament to the capabilities of mankind as it is an
architectural achievement. Constructed over several centuries and
possibly even millennia, the Great Wall is a series of border defenses
formed over various dynasties that responded to the particular threats
facing the empire in power at the time of their construction.1 3 The
actual construction of these distinct walls spanned multiple reigns
within those dynasties, suggesting that they "resulted after long evolutionary processes which involved initial construction at the most vulnerable locations, followed by gradual extensions and links." 139 The
walls were thus part of a broader project designed to solve perpetual
security issues, which despite their mishmash of often rudimentary
137. As I argue in more detail later in the Article, there is a trickle-down effect that
any prescribed method of adjudication will have upon the lawyers appearing before
courts. See infra Part IX.
138. DANIEL SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA 219 (1990).
139. WILLIAM LINDESAY, THE GREAT WALL 7 (2003).
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construction materials achieved the honorific "great" in retrospect
once outsiders encountered the sheer scale of the construction.1 4 0
The development of Anglo-American law is a similarly vast project
undertaken over several generations, with each responding to the
unique issues and circumstances that dominate their day. The whole
of this construction is what gives "law" a strongly positive connotation; the edifice was built by a series of skilled craftsmen working diligently together not only in the present time but across centuries,
leaving the overall structure in a "better" or "stronger" arrangement
for modern legal architects. This cross-generational aspect of law dictates the pride of place precedent receives in a theory of adjudication.
Precedent acts as the existing configuration of the law as well as the
building materials with which future legal minds will construct their
own forms. While some might reject this metaphor as an aggrandizement of the legal process, it usefully highlights the important role precedent can and should play in society's development over time.
Others have used similar metaphors to describe the work of appellate judges across time. Ronald Dworkin described judges as authors
of a particular chapter in a chain-novel, taking the chapters written
before them and attempting to make the novel the best they can
through their own additions.1 4 ' This adjudicatory structure is necessary given the limited life-span of any particular judge. No one legal
author is prescient enough to predict and resolve all possible controversies in advance. This requires certain acknowledgments on the
part of a judge, which Gerald Postema summarizes brilliantly:
[T]he success of that chapter, and so the significance of [a judge's]
contribution to the novel as a whole, depends on whether the
themes she develops in her chapter are taken up in appropriate
ways by subsequent writers in the chain. But, then, the success of
the interpretation is dependent inter alia on the interpretive activities of other participants in that enterprise. So the chain novelist
must view the project as a collective project, to which she will make
a contribution, the meaning and success of which is a product of the
interaction (in both interpreting and writing) of all the participants.
A novelist in the chain cannot regard herself in abstraction from the
collective project in order to construct her interpretation of the
work without jeopardizing her contribution and the integrity of the
work as a whole. She must construct an interpretation, cognizant of
the interpretive activity of other contributors, both past and
future.142
It could be argued that this cross-generational process is a wholly
undesirable condition which institutional designers should temper as
much as possible, avoiding undue complexity and the influence of the
140. Id.
141. DWORKIN, LAW'S

EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 228-38.
142. Postema, supra note 108, at 311-12.
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dead hand of prior judges.' 4 3 But that position is unpersuasive when
one properly considers adjudication as a process of refinement rather
than creation. On this understanding, the chain-novel features of adjudicative development are an advantage rather than a hindrance.' 4 4
By seeking contributions from earlier generations and trusting that
future adjudicators will continue on the same deliberate and calculated path, judges can account for their limited life-spans and obtain
more varied and intelligent contributions than any one author could
hope to produce.145 Rather than operating with absolute freedom,
judges will be limited to making incremental changes within the analysis presented in prior cases, lest their own refinements be disregarded
by subsequent authors.146 Law is thus an exercise in the refinement of
common legal ideals, and further refinement and analysis is always
possible.147 The process of adjudication, which includes humble adherence to precedent with only limited exceptions, is the very process
of determining when justice allows a change in our previous conception of an appropriate outcome. 148 That a wide variety of strong opinions exists regarding any particular legal topic should not be overly
discouraging: "a diversity of opinion in astronomy does not undermine the prospect of objective right answers . . . and nor should a

diversity of opinion about justice undermine our view that there are

143. For more details on the complexity of the chain-novelist's project, see DWORLAW's EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 231-32.
144. Some have suggested that deriving moral principles such as justice similarly
requires constant revision and refinement of earlier conceptions as part of an ongoing
project. AMARYTA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 86 (2011) ("To ask how things are
going and whether they can be improved is a constant and inescapable part of the
pursuit of justice."). I agree that the law, too, should be an ongoing project that continually evolves our understanding of the very abstract principles that are its focus,
either through the common law tradition or through constitutional analysis. But that
project must build. Each individual participant cannot possibly erect her own structure for the law from the ground up, or any advance in the law as time passes will
become impossible.
145. STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 37 ("[The law] can develop over time, not at a
single moment; it can be the evolutionary product of many people, in many generations. There does not have to be one entity who commanded the law in a discrete act
at a particular time."); Sherwin, supra note 37, at 1189 ("[I]f the pattern of the decisions and the remarks of the judges who decided them suggest a common idea, that
idea is worth attending to because it represents the collective reasoning of a number
of judges over time.").
146. For a fuller discussion of this point, see Rasmusen, supra note 107.
147. In many cases, "[t]he official's failure to implement the law because it is unjust, or the citizen's doing something other than what the law requires because that
would be more just, is tantamount to abandoning the very idea of law-the very idea
of the community taking a position on an issue on which it's members disagree." JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 37 (1999) (emphasis in original).
148. Judges play a role as facilitators of the debate over our shared understanding
of social ideals, and a vital one. Without their input along the fault-lines of widespread agreement, that debate would hardly get started.
KIN,
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right answers in that realm as well."14 9 Those opinions should be
taken into account by the humble judge and built upon, allowing the
process to continue ad infinitum.
A useful comparison of the refinement of legal ideas and the refinement of one's senses can be made. Even though we cannot reach precisely agreed definitions for terms such as salty or sweet, almost
everyone has the capacity to understand those terms. Just as we can
cook a meal in an effort to match our tastes and produce more excellent, refined dishes, the law can continually refine our innate understanding of abstract ideals. Though an ultimate resolution may
remain out of our reach, this is not an aimless project. As each generation offers a more thorough account of the ideals that ought to guide
our interactions, society continues to flourish. To abandon the project
simply because clear answers are not forthcoming is analogous to
abandoning a race because the fastest time possible is not yet known.
The race is run in an effort to break the previous record, and the new
record itself is not designed to stand in perpetuity but to mark a stage
of development in the athletic quest for which future participants can
strive.
In many if not most areas of law, the legal chain-novelist is handed
a mostly completed text; the ideals and principles in a given area have
already received at least vague treatment. The task of the judge adding to that body of work is to refine those principles that no longer
appear adequate, rather than to complete an unfinished story or begin
a new one from scratch. In undertaking this refining project, a humble approach towards the law placing significant reliance upon precedent is required. The judge must recognize the nature of her project
and assess cases in light of already existing and well-considered legal
principles, seeking only to tweak analyses stated in prior decisions.
Even if a judge had an infinite life span, her understanding of the
abstract legal principles in play might change over time. By passing
the task of legal decision-making from one era to the next, each new
generation can apply its own intellectual strengths to the same fields
in an effort to sharpen those aspects of the law the previous generaIn this way, society pertion may not have realized were wanting.'

149.

WALDRON,

supra note 147, at 49 (citation omitted). "What it might under-

mine, though-indeed, what it should undermine-is our confidence that the right
answer can be discerned (from among all the views that are put forward) in any way
that is politically dispositive." Id. at 49-50. This may be one reason to favor judicial
resolution.

150. As David Strauss notes about the common-law generally, "[t]he content of the
law is determined by the evolutionary process that produced it. Present-day interpreters may contribute to the evolution-but only by continuing the evolution, not by
ignoring what exists and starting anew." STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 38.
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petually progresses rather then remaining stuck in the static opinions
of a single legal author.15 1
A judge aware of her own mortality may be tempted to make
changes for the better as quickly as possible and complete broader
adjustments in our legal traditions rapidly. But a judge that truly
wishes to contribute to the overall project of advancing our society
through the law would acknowledge that she can best extend her influence by working as part of a team across generations, thereby tempering her own myopic views. Constancy in a particular legal tradition
is desirable and changes in that tradition should be approached with
trepidation; judges ought to carefully consider proposed alterations to
the legal structure they inherit. Referring to common law adjudication generally, David Strauss usefully illustrates the point:
The first attitude at the foundation of the common law is humility
about the power of individual human reason. It is a bad idea to try
to resolve a problem on your own, without referring to the collective wisdom of other people who have tried to solve the same problem. That is why it makes sense to follow precedent, especially if
the precedents are clear and have been established for a long time.
"We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own stock of
reason," Burke said, "because we suspect that this stock in each
man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations." The accumulated
precedents are "the general bank and capital." It is an act of intellectual hubris to think that you know better than that accumulated
wisdom. 152
The point should not be taken too far or it may again devolve into
the claim that prior decisions ought to be respected solely on the basis
of their status as prior; after all "[i]t is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV."153 But respect for prior opinions is not required simply
because they are prior in time. Instead, the judge's humility reminds
her that she can only hope to improve that body of law through cautious advancement and even more cautious efforts to cut back on its
growth. The humble judge acknowledges "the insight that the result
of the experimentation of many generations may embody more expe151. Dworkin seems to suggest that lawyers are often misled into thinking that the
law works towards a purer form; for a law-as-integrity theorist, any pure form of law
would in fact simply be what the law is now, not at some future time. DWORKIN,
LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 400. However, Dworkin does seem to temper that
point by acknowledging that some doctrine of precedent remains an important part of
the law, although seemingly simply because that tradition is contained within the law
and violating it would itself violate any conception of integrity. Id. at 401.
152. STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 41 (quoting EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON
THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 251 (J.C.D. Clark ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2001)
(1790)).
153. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897).
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rience than any one man possesses" 154 before forthrightly suggesting
that a break from the tradition embodied in precedent is required.
And to preserve that tradition of cross-generational experimentation
and legal refinement, the present-day judge must herself remain faithful to precedent, increasing the odds that her own limited alterations
to the shape of the law will in turn be preserved by future generations
of humble adjudicators.ss
Opponents of a robust theory of precedent might argue that crossgenerational judicial humility mistakenly places faith in human reason
to refine the law over time, rather than compound its mistakes or introduce new impurities.15 6 But if our faith in human reason is limited,
it would be far more misguided to allow a contemporary actor to describe the end-state of the law that from now on will justly guide all
conduct. The law does and should change, but at a tempered pace,
and judges should remain circumscribed and deliberate by relying
heavily upon precedent."' The humble judge begins with the presumption that precedent is a valid advancement given its position in
the larger- and longer-term project of refining abstract legal concepts.' 5" Rather than discarding prior judges' combined analytical
prowess, present judges access and rely upon that prowess to advance
interpretation. Hercules, Dworkin's model adjudicator, is above all
humble, and his encyclopedic knowledge of the prior established areas
of law, growing from the specific to the general in concentric circles,
154. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 62 (1960).
155. Although he uses particularly broad language to describe judicial discretion,
Eric Rasmusen usefully illustrates the incentives of present-day judges. Rasmusen,
supra note 107, at 67 ("Even if [a judge] feels he can successfully make policy today
against the will of the legislature and the decisions of past judges, he knows that the
judges who succeed him can change that policy. Thus, he shows restraint in most
areas of law in the hopes that where he does innovate, the innovation will be permanent."). I turn to this issue in more depth later. See infra Part IX.
156. E.g., Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 765,
777 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, Common Law] ("To believe that the common law
works itself pure is to believe that subsequent cases correct the errors of earlier ones
far more than they add errors to previously sound doctrines, and that new cases present opportunities for refinement rather than occasions for mistake. . . . In the hands
of the wrong people, the law may be as likely to work itself impure as pure, or so at
least many people believe, and thus once again the faith that produced the common
law in the first place is a faith that seems no longer to exist.").
157. My account of precedent thus fits within the range of accounts that can be
described as common-law constitutionalism, of which Strauss's is a particularly enlightening example. See STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 37.
158. This idea is fundamental in the common law tradition as captured by Blackstone: "The doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust: for though their reason be not obvious at first
view, yet we owe such a deference to former times, as not to suppose that they acted
wholly without consideration." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES 70 (1753).
However, it is worth noting that Blackstone also supported the thesis that precedent
could be overruled or ignored in many situations, "[f]or if it be found that the former
decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad
law, but that it was not law." Id.
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reflects that humility, not of his preference for integrity simply for integrity's sake.' 5 9
Further consideration of so-called checkerboard law illustrates the
role precedent should play in appellate adjudication. Whether integrity has normative value in itself or as a component of the pursuit of
justice, checkerboard solutions are a particularly poor means of participating in discourse designed to refine the abstract ideals that dot
the legal landscape. Checkerboard solutions suggest that society can
partially cater to a particularly strongly-held opinion, even if misguided, and move on to the next (hopefully less divisive) controversy.
But neither citizens nor judges should be so defeatist. Honest discussion with a reasonably determinate outcome is a better route because
it is a means of refining our ideals. 16 0 Even if the revisions offered
later prove undesirable and in need of revision themselves, the effort
of choosing and applying a common solution is far more desirable
than making an avowedly arbitrary compromise. 161
Much like our sensory perceptions of saltiness and sweetness, many
of our legal (and especially constitutional) precepts are necessarily
vague and admit of no singular, clear definition. They may therefore
be "essentially contested concepts" that benefit from continued efforts at discussion and refinement.' 6 2 Though the participants in the
discussion are not likely to experience sudden epiphanies revealing
that their opponents' positions are accurate in principle,
"[r]ealistically the hope one invests in one's participation in such a
dispute is that the contestation-and the sense of the underlying ideal
at subsequent stages-will be the better for one's intervention."1 63 In
this sense, the essentially contestable aspects of law (and especially
our constitutional tradition) benefit from cross-generational discussion and development. While it may not be possible to confidently
state the precise meaning of a particular ideal, it remains a worthwhile
endeavor to discuss competing views on the issue and ultimately implement one conception even if we must later reverse course.
159. To his credit, Dworkin highlights the way in which our principles of political
morality will change over time as we attempt to construct a better state. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 164 ("Politics, for us, is evolutionary rather than
axiomatic; we recognize, in working toward a perfectly just state, that we already belong to a different one."). At least in the abstract, then, Dworkin might be willing to
accept a conception of adjudication that is itself designed to refine the law over time.
160. Importantly, appellate decisions allow the state to implement these solutions
on a small scale at first, favoring a method of experimentation that does not threaten
stability nearly as much as sweeping legislative programs.
161. See STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 40-42 (discussing the attitude of "cautious empiricism" in a common law judge).
162. This idea is attributed to W. B. Gallic in an article dealing with ideas in linguistic philosophy. See Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (In Florida)?, 21 LAW & PHIL. 137, 148 n.27 (2002) (citing W. B. Gallic,
Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN Soc'v 167 (1956)).
163. Waldron, supra note 162, at 153.
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The law is like a great project of humanity that modestly improves
only through slow, considered restructuring and renovation. Rather
than redesigning the law wholesale, judges should work to build upon
and refine the existing legal structure that is the product of prior generations' carefully considered work, continuing to adapt that structure
in response to modern social controversies. Precedent is the bedrock
of that project, the Great Wall of prior legal dynasties upon which
present legal decisions should be based to ensure that just outcomes
are consistently achieved.
VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Before turning to the repercussions of my view, I want to emphasize
why a supplementary argument for precedent beyond the traditional
accounts discussed earlier is especially important in constitutional
cases. Many will contend that any unjust result is contrary to the essence of constitutional rights, which should act as inviolable trumps a
citizen can invoke against a government intrusion without those rights
being balanced with justice on a society-wide, systemic level.164 Further, constitutional theorists note that the text of the United States
Constitution itself contains no reference to stare decisis, and therefore
a prior decision that violates the Constitution cannot be legal."' If a
theory admits that reliance on precedent will work at least occasional
injustices, it seems necessary to grant that it is unsustainable in constitutional cases.
The standing counter to this claim is that stare decisis remains a
principle of constitutional magnitude, "but one that is rooted as much
in unwritten norms of constitutional practice as in the written Constitution itself."16 6 This position seems to hold sway amongst Supreme
Court justices, at least when it has been discussed in recent confirmation hearings. 1 67 Certainly, modes of argument beyond pure constitu164. See Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153-67 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
165. See Paulsen, Marbury, supra note 39, at 2731-32; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Intrinsically CorruptingInfluence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 291 (2005).
166. Fallon, supra note 49, at 572. Fallon argues that "[w]ithin constitutional practice, stare decisis has acquired a lawful status that is partly independent of the language and original understanding of the written Constitution," one which remains
viable insofar as it is "reconcilable" with the text. Id. at 588.
167. Friedman, supra note 2, at 30 (quoting Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005), 2005 WL 2204109 (statement
of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.); ConfirmationHearingon the Nomination of Samuel A.
Alito, Jr. To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary,109th Cong. 318 (2006), 2006 WL 75414 (statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr.)) ("[I]n their confirmation hearings both thenJudge Roberts and then-Judge Alito gave assurances about adherence to stare decisis.
Judge Roberts told Senator Specter that 'j]udges have to have the humility to recognize that they operate within a system of precedent;' Judge Alito, for his part, called
stare decisis 'a fundamental part of our legal system,' citing its virtues.").
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tional textualism seem appropriate, including the tradition of respect
for precedent due in part to its history of widespread acceptance. 168
In addition, some textual grounding for stare decisis has been suggested: "Article III's grant of 'the judicial Power' authorizes the Supreme Court to elaborate and rely on a principle of stare decisis and,
more generally, to treat precedent as a constituent element of constitutional adjudication."1 69 This position does not challenge the claim
that stare decisis in constitutional cases will sometimes produce unjust
results, instead countering that stare decisis was understood by the
framers to be inherent in the judicial power exercised by federal
courts.170
Defenders of stare decisis in constitutional cases may be able to reject the claims of critics even more directly by arguing that reliance on
constitutional precedents in fact produces more just results. As I have
attempted to illustrate, a just decision necessarily has an author who
approaches her work with the humility needed to respect precedent
horizontally and cross-generationally. Textual and historical claims
aside, precedent has priority of place in a theory of constitutional adjudication simply because it can be a source of, rather than an obstacle
to, just decisions, guiding the justices' exercises of discretion as they
continue to refine abstract constitutional principles in keeping with
shifting constitutional understandings in society at large.'
It may be all the more important for constitutional interpreters to
robustly rely on precedent given the unique complications presented
by that type of interpretation. The founding document of the United
States is inherently ambiguous, perhaps simply due to the difficultly of
pinning down abstract ideals of legal rights concretely or the perceived undesirability of doing so. 172 The text does not merely allow
justices to give varying interpretations but seems to require them to
168. Henry Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731,
794 (2010).
169. Fallon, supra note 49, at 577 (citing Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898,
899-900 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 1997 (1994)).
170. See Fallon, supra note 49, at 578-82.
171. Although I make an argument more directly on the grounds of justice, I do not
mean to suggest that Fallon's understanding of "the judicial Power" is misguided.
Rather, I simply argue that a more direct defense of stare decisis is possible and may
be more convincing to its would-be detractors.
172. W.J. WALUCHOW, A COMMON LAW THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE LivING TREE 207 (2007) (quoting Denise Reaume, Of Pigeonholes and Principles:A Reconsideration of Discrimination Law, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 113, 117 (2002))
("[A]lthough we may agree on and be deeply committed to certain abstract values or
principles, we cannot anticipate all the fact situations in which they may be implicated, nor can we fully map out a comprehensive view of the concrete consequences
implicated by those values.. . . In such situations, it is wise not to attempt a comprehensive theory issuing a precise network of rules at the outset, but rather to let the
implications of the abstract principles be revealed incrementally through confronting
fact situations on a case-by-case basis.").
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provide further refinements as new factual scenarios arise. 173 This is
not to say that the words of the Constitution have no meaning. But
frequently the discussion in constitutional cases quickly moves from
the text to consideration of guiding decisions in the area under consideration.17 4 By leaving open a variety of interpretations, the Constitution permits judicial exposition of the deeper meaning of the language
in the document itself to cover the most (and most effective) ground
17
The text is only the start of the
possible towards a better society."
interpretation of the ideals it contains, and precedent continues to
grow from it into a significantly larger body than the spare words of

the document.176

The Constitution's very indeterminacy requires reliance upon precedent to avoid the problem of justices simply talking past one another as they engage in their interpretive project. Precedent plays an
important settlement role in the necessarily large subset of constitutional cases without clear answers. While opponents of precedent
might suggest that justices should ignore obviously unconstitutional
decisions, that instruction fails to meaningfully identify which prior
cases should be so discarded, a question that cannot be answered
outside of a decision making process that delves deeply into both the
outcomes and analytical structures of prior cases. We should avoid
173. Theorists of both a positivist and a non-positivist ilk have argued that the U.S.
Constitution inherently requires those interpreting and applying it to consider at least
some moral principles in this refining process. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES,
supra note 72, at 187-98 (discussing JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE:
IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2001)).
174. STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 33. One might contend, then, that the constitution
did not significantly dilute the sturdiness of the common-law tradition. It may have
represented a step away from that tradition, but only a cautious step.
175. Empirical analysis reveals that arguments from precedent "vastly outnumber
all other kinds of arguments in attorney's written briefs, the [Supreme] Court's written opinions, and the justices' arguments in conference discussions." Ethan Bueno de
Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent and IntrajudicialCommunication, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 755, 764 (2002) (citing Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The

Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 Am. J. POL. Sci. 1018 (1996); Glenn A. Phelps & John B.
Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence:Interpretive Theory in the Constitutional Opinions
of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567 (1991)).
176. It can certainly be argued that the Constitution is the product of the general
distrust our founders had for future interpreters, and therefore judges should defer to
its text rather than exercise broad interpretive discretion. SHAPIRO, supra note 106, at
346-49. On this account, the legitimacy of the legal system is at stake if judges feel
qualified to evaluate their own abilities as constitutional expositors, rather than filling
the constrained role outlined by the founders and "ratified by an overwhelming majority of adults in the political community after a full and fair debate." Id. at 349.
Even if my own prescriptions dilute what judicial respect for constitutional text remains, they are certainly not an effort to promote unrestrained judicial discretion;
rather, they acknowledge the constraining role that prior precedent plays as judges
issue new constitutional rulings in light of prior judicial opinions just as they hope
future judges will rely on their own doctrinal advancements. While my approach to
judicial humility (and therefore restraint) is different, I sympathize with the desire for
further restraint than that contained in a fully Dworkinian method of interpretation.
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overturning past judgments in part because "given the intense debate
in society over various social and political principles, including the
principles that courts apply in reaching their decisions, some court decisions are in certain respects like making a commitment in arbitrary
cases.""' Especially in constitutional cases, justices must take the existing settlements that precedent represents as the basis for their discourse to further refine the controversial principles at stake."' This
allows the justices to meaningfully debate the extension of the basic
agreement represented by the constitutional text. Precedent constrains the field of debate amongst justices to an analytical background about which all can agree, and from which further refinement
of constitutional ideals is actually possible. While some justices might
wish that certain earlier opinions were never issued, their existence

should not be ignored. 1 79
While I take the United States' case as a paradigm, the same argument applies even to more specifically enumerated constitutions
adopted elsewhere. Admittedly, recent efforts at constitutional construction contain far more specific government mandates and descriptions of rights."o Frederick Schauer argues that while the generalities
of the U.S. Constitution seem to require a process of slow, incremental refinement of the understanding of those ideals along a common
law-like path, the modern trend towards additional constitutional precision, as well as the efforts of the Supreme Court itself to elaborate
more precise constitutional tests, demonstrate the receding influence
of the common law approach and its attendant rules of precedent.' 8 1
But this view overestimates the degree to which the process of judicial
refinement of abstract constitutional ideals (as well as the effort by
constitutional drafters to create mandates that are more specific) demonstrates modern law's final, code-like status. Constitutions "can and
should be seen to represent a mixture of only very modest pre-commitment and confidence, combined with a considerable measure of
177. Benditt, supra note 8, at 92. While Benditt notes that "[t]he greater the agreement on principles, the less like an arbitrary commitment a judicial decision is," id., I
think it especially important in the most controversial cases to commit "to continue to
live with a disputed principle or its application even when suspicions arise that it may
be wrong." Id.
178. Id. ("Following precedent can thus be seen as a hedge against our ... lack of
certainty about the correctness of certain of the social and political principles we
adopt.").
179. There is a hint of this idea in Dworkin's discussion on the distinction between
concept and conception, according to which a broad agreement about a concept may
later be seen as part of that concept's very meaning and therefore act "as a kind of
plateau on which further thought and argument are built." DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE,
supra note 23, at 70. H.L.A. Hart presents a similar argument that legal meaning can
be conceived of as a core of determinacy with a surrounding area in which discretion
may properly be exercised by the judge. See HART, supra note 14, at 144-45.
180. Schauer, Common Law, supra note 156, at 766-67.
181. Id. at 772-73.
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humility."1 8 2 Judicial (or legislative) refinement of legal concepts is a
perpetual process, not one designed to achieve any end-state stripping
legal decision makers of all discretion.
The modern trend towards constitutional specificity simply represents the effort of younger nations to incorporate the legal developments of the past without repeating the often painful history of
refining legal concepts from more abstract beginnings. A constitution
should be taken as a humble declaration of rights deserving of especially strident protection for the time being, not a more hubristic claim
to have settled the question for all time.'8 3 Modern constitutional
drafters have merely attempted to define the legal foundations of
their societies in ways that build upon many of the landmark decisions
in Anglo-American legal history; they have not suggested that the
work of judges in refining the law for future generations is somehow
complete nor have they bound future generations to an originalist interpretation of the Constitution simply because it is more verbose and
expansive. For instance, the drafters of the Indian constitution specifically avoided the phrase "due process of law" in favor of seemingly
more precise formulations in order to sidestep the controversy over
substantive due process claims; however, many of the same principles
have arguably become a part of modern Indian constitutional jurisprudence.' 8 4 The line in the sand defining the rights of citizens and responsibilities of government that a modern constitution represents can
be more detailed simply because it builds upon the successes and mistakes of adjudication in other constitutional societies. Such added detail means refinement of abstract ideals begins from a later stage of
development in younger countries, but the process of constitutional
adjudication remains the same unending, careful progression towards
a fuller understanding of those ideals, a progression in which precedent will play a crucial role.' 8
182. WALUCHOW, supra note 172, at 213.
183. Id. at 246.
184. Abhinav Chandrachud, Of Constitutional "Due Process," THE HINDU (May
24, 2010, 9:43 AM), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article436586.ece?service
=mobile. The same may also be true of the Canadian constitutional tradition. See
David M. Siegel, CanadianFundamental Justice and U.S. Due Process: Two Models
for a Guaranteeof Basic Adjudicative Fairness, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 1, 2
(2005).
185. By extension, an admittedly radical (and unrealistic) argument for more ready
codification of U.S. constitutional precedents in the text could be made. As more and
more cases arise, more decisions are needed, and the law must adapt to changing
conditions with ever more speed. Thus, the temptation for arbitrary, rapid-fire opinions issued without sufficient consideration of precedent is great. As precedent becomes overbearingly difficult to comprehend or clarify, judicial agreement upon
which decisions are canonical is likewise more taxing. It might be desirable to add
specificity to the constitution's text by codifying some precedent, thereby ensuring
that those decisions will be a starting point for judicial discussion and assuring litigants of the permanence of certain once-controversial precepts of law. Constitutional
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That the Constitution must necessarily be augmented by judicial interpretation does not imply that judges should rigidly follow former
interpretations of its principles to the letter. But justices must humbly
work through those constitutional precedents even when suggesting
new interpretations. That very humility allows justices to balance current social cohesion and the advancement of broader constitutional
ideals, guiding their discretion towards just results. Humility is a necessary aspect of justice within the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence, not an expedient that should be tossed asunder when the
"correctness" of a prior decision is in dispute.
IX.

THE VALUE OF OPINIONS

Having sketched my own position in favor of strong reliance on precedent, I now turn to some of its apparent implications, beginning
with the output of the judicial process in appellate courts. Some have
instructed judges to "consider what you think justice requires and decide accordingly. But never give your reasons; for your judgment will
probably be right, but your reasons will certainly be wrong." 186 indeed, there is little prima facie cause for a judge to reduce her reasoning to a published opinion when such reasoning will give observers
grounds to disagree and suggest re-litigation. It is an understandable
temptation for a judge to intentionally dilute her language when rendering a decision as a hedge against potential criticism and the instability that may result.' 8 And to the extent a judge is committed to the
amendment could be utilized to establish with finality that certain precedents are now
part of the line-in-the-sand that the constitution itself represents.
The Article V amendment process may be too strict for alterations that simply affirm and codify the Supreme Court's repeated view on a particular issue. A simplified
process would both allow justices to remain faithful to precedent in most cases, avoiding inconsistency or any waning in the influence of precedent, and give citizens a
mechanism to express their approval (or lack thereof) of Supreme Court debate surrounding abstract constitutional principles. Such an amendment could not be substantive; it could only state simply that "this amendment codifies the Supreme Court's
decision in Case X." The limitation to the scope of these amendments would distinguish them from other types of amendments to trigger the easier amendment procedure, and also avoid the problem of requiring interpretation by the courts to derive a
clear meaning for the amendment. See WALDRON, supra note 147, at 10 (on the role
of courts in defining the terms of a new legislative enactment). Where a new law is so
circumscribed that it merely affirms a Supreme Court decision, the meaning of the
law cannot admit of any other interpretation than simply that justices must take account of a precedent in their decisional matrix. By limiting the field of debatable
principles, such amendments would encourage justices to work through well-established analytical frameworks rather than face a web of overwhelmingly complex and
conflicting approaches.
186. SEN, supra note 144, at 4 (quoting 2 JOHN CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE
CHIEF JUSTICES IN ENGLAND: FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TILL THE DEATH OF

LORD MANSFIELD 572 (John Murray ed., 1949-1957) (1849)).

187. Fear of a public backlash may play a larger role than commonly thought in the
ultimate decisions of high appellate courts. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 33;
WALUCHOW, supra note 172, at 201.
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reasons she gives for a particular decision in future cases, she may
avoid giving reasons simply to dodge any commitment to wrong outcomes in subsequent cases.18 8 But even if the judge's opinions will
likely be exposed as wrongheaded by future critics, the judge must
express them publicly and candidly in order to most easily advance the
shared, cross-generational endeavor that is the law.
First, opinions are necessary if courts are to remain politically viable. A candid, well-reasoned decision has obvious benefits for the
parties to the controversy, who are far more likely to respect such a
resolution. A judge can quickly deplete the judiciary's political capital
if her opinions appear largely arbitrary, and nothing appears more arbitrary than a decision lacking appropriate supporting reasons. By expressing her justifications for a given decision, the judge makes
significant strides towards placating the losing party by explaining the
deficits in that party's position, in the process signaling "that [the parties'] participation in the decision has been real, that the arbiter has in
fact understood and taken into account their proofs and arguments." 8 9 Only by giving reasons for a decision can the court argue
that the conclusion reached was one supported by some reasoned
ground, not simply a judicial coin-flip.' 90 And the craft of that explanation is likely improved by the practice of publishing the reasons for
one's decision; as Richard Posner has remarked, "[a]ppellate judges in
nonroutine cases are expected to express as best they can the reasons
for their decisions in signed, public, citable documents (the published
decisions of these courts), and this practice creates accountability and
fosters a certain thoughtfulness and self-discipline."' 91
There is also an important role for opinions to play in promoting
the stability provided by the rule of law. 192 Published opinions pub188. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 656 (1995) [hereinafter Schauer, Giving Reasons] ("If reasons are what cause the right outcome in this
case to generate wrong outcomes in others, then weakening the reason-giving requirement can produce the right outcome now without negative side effects."). Schauer
later acknowledges some advantages to the judicial practice of providing reasons for a
decision, "the most obvious being the very commitment that is at times a disadvantage." Id. at 657.
189. Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388
(1978).
190. Id. at 367 ("We demand of an adjudicative decision a kind of rationality we do
not expect of the results of contract or of voting.").
191. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
257 (1999); see also Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 188, at 657-58 ("Under some
circumstances, the very time required to give reasons may reduce excess haste and
thus produce better decisions. A reason-giving mandate will also drive out illegitimate reasons when they are the only plausible explanation for particular outcomes.").
192. See Jeffrey Kahn, The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L.
353, 369 (2006) ("Published opinions promote publicity, predictability and steadiness
of the body of law, while avoiding secret action or favor, by creating pressure to conduct careful analysis of the facts and issues before the court, to justify with law and
reason the decision that is made.").
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licly display the state of the law, giving guidance to rational actors and
allowing them to self-apply legal norms in future cases.' 93 They promote planned actions that presuppose a stable set of legal strictures,
actions that lead to economic and social growth. Published opinions
also generalize legal standards and rules beyond the particular facts of
a case, again supporting citizens' planning.19 4 In constitutional cases,
detailed written opinions lay open for debate the propriety of the Supreme Court's views within particular fields of doctrine; the Court is
not subject to accusations of arbitrariness or impropriety unless the
written material produced as an accompaniment for the decision
reveals the basis for its opinion.' 95 Even if a large majority of the
population will not engage in careful study of an appellate court's
views, making those views generally available serves an important
promulgation function, highlighting the current state of doctrine and
making those views accessible.' 96 The simple fact that those opinions
are published and publicly available also assuages the community's
fears; much as published opinions reassure the parties that their arguments have been heard, they can reassure a wary public that judges
are not taking decisions without a significant and stabilizing ground in
past practice.
Putting political viability to one side, written decisions are also of
the utmost importance to the humble judge in advancing, through
human reason, the overall project of the law across generations. If
decisions are limited to bare bones outcomes, they are of very little
193. For more on the importance of the self-application of legal norms, see HENRY
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 119-121 (1994).
194. Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 188, at 635 ("The act of giving a reason,
therefore, is an exercise in generalization. The lawyer or judge who gives a reason
steps behind and beyond the case at hand to something more encompassing.").
Schauer later argues that simply in virtue of giving a reason for a decision, a judge
commits herself to other outcomes falling within the scope of that reason. Id. However, he seems ultimately puzzled by that result, and by the legal system's apparent
supposition "that it is sometimes desirable for legal decision makers to be committed
to, and therefore constrained by, a range of results larger than the case at hand." Id.
at 653. I argue that there is a purpose to committing a judge to her reasons, at least
until an argument persuades her otherwise-doing so allows the judge to humbly participate in a collegial and cross-generational refinement of the law, and constrains the
discretion of those whose ambition is to make the largest mark possible on that body
of law.
195. This is what led Frank Douglas Wagner, longtime reporter of decisions for the
Court, to remark that "public access to the Court's decisions, no matter what the
medium or source, is one of the bearings that keep democracy's wheels turning true."
Naseem Stecker, Reflections of a Modern Scribe, 84 MICH. B.J. 2, 41 (2005), cited in
Kahn, supra note 192, at 393 n.136.
196. The importance of such promulgation has been preached by a long line of
Rule of Law scholars, notably including Lon Fuller. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 49-51 (1964) (arguing that "[e]ven if only one man in a hundred takes the
pains to inform himself concerning, say, the laws applicable to the practice of his
calling, this is enough to justify the trouble taken to make the laws generally
available.").
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value; 197 without written building blocks already in existence, constructing a consistent jurisprudence and advancing our understanding
of abstract ideals is nigh impossible. If a pattern of outcome-only adjudication became prevalent, the justification for relying on precedent
as part of a broader project of legal refinement would itself be significantly weakened. There would be no growth for the law to pursue,
and no reason to believe that prior decisions are important to study
other than their brute existence.
Opinions that include the reasons for a decision allow judges to adhere to what I earlier called a thick version of stare decisis, relying not
just on outcomes but also on the analytical structure of prior cases.
The process of legal refinement requires more than somehow divining
a rule or standard out of a series of prior outcomes; judges must delve
deeply into the analysis presented by those prior cases198 and must
leave behind for future judges a lattice or matrix of reasoning upon
which they can build. The analytical structure in precedents allows a
humble judge to work more easily in tandem with her colleagues,
rather than each trying to devise the structure and scope of their reasoning independently. While the text of a statute may provide some
common beginning for discussion amongst judicial colleagues, the
more fully-developed reasoning of prior courts will not only alert present courts to the most important issues, but will give form to the
court's internal debates before an ultimate conclusion is reached.
Published opinions relying on precedent can also act as a useful
constraint on judicial discretion. Even judges seeking to make broad
changes in the legal landscape have incentives to craft humble opinions that clearly defer to the work of their predecessors. Written decisions that take such a humble approach necessarily imply that a
present-day judge will remain deferential towards prior precedent.
While this may constrain the discretion exercised by the present-day
judge, it also suggests a constraint to future judges inclined to disregard any legal refinements the present-day judge has developed. A
judge seeking to maximize her influence will ensure that her opinions
remain faithful to precedent with only occasional, well-reasoned exceptions, finding it "advantageous to follow rules announced by [her]
predecessors, so that successors will follow [her] rules in turn."' 9 9 Fol197. Regarding English decisions, Rupert Cross and J. W. Harris suggest that "the
authority of a decision for which no reasons are given is very weak, because it is so
hard to tell which facts were regarded as material and which were thought to be immaterial." RUPERT CROSS & J. W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAw 47 (2d ed.
1991).
198. See Sherwin, supra note 37, at 1195-96 (making a similar contention about the
attention a judge must pay to the details of prior cases when reasoning by analogy).
199. Rasmusen, supra note 107, at 67 (quoting Frank Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 817 (1982)). "Judges need no professional con-

science to impel them to obey existing law even when they think it bad policy, but
instead can be made to obey it to maximize their own influence, in the hope that the
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lowing precedent may then be a self-reinforcing constraint on judicial
discretion,2 0 0 one which will be enhanced if future judges are particularly disinterested in prior analyses that fail to take a humble, precedent-centered approach.20 1
Any theory of adjudication also necessarily affects the methods employed by lawyers acting on behalf of litigants. Publicly expressed judicial humility, demonstrated by published decisions relying heavily
on prior precedent, will encourage similar humility in legal advocacy
by showing that judges will generally avoid deviations from the views
they have expressed in prior opinions.2 02 Lawyers will become aware
of the unlikelihood of drastic doctrinal changes by judges committed
previously to a particular line of reasoning. This is not to say that
litigants ought to be discouraged from arguing for expansions of existing rights or logical extensions of long-held principles. But counsel
should temper their passions and present arguments in the context of
a legal structure that develops and grows based upon the past. That
mode of argument is encouraged by the publication of humble, carefully-reasoned opinions. Publishing such opinions does not disavow
all change but does discourage lawyers from arguing repeatedly for
the repudiation of existing analytical approaches or overly dramatic
shifts in doctrine that would only decrease the reliability of the law
and, in turn, the stability of the social structure.
The thick form of stare decisis is especially important in constitutional jurisprudence. Given the small number of cases the Supreme
Court of the United States hears on an annual basis,20 3 the likelihood
that the Court will address two cases that are factually similar in all
relevant respects is indeed quite low. 20 4 Still, precedent ought not be
disregarded. The Court can draw a useful analytical approach from
prior cases. Strong factual identity is not required for the use of such
analytical structure; rough correspondence between the constitutional
clauses and ideas upon which the cases turn will suffice. By focusing
on broader areas of constitutional law and looking less for tight facnew law they create interstitially will be obeyed by future judges. In theory, then, it is
possible even for purely self-interested judges to discipline each other." Id. at 81.
200. Id. at 80 ("If all the treatises, law professors, and law reviews . . . predict that
future judges will obey precedent if present judges do, the predictions may become
self-confirming.").
201. Id. at 82 ("Future judges must impose sanctions on judges who break precedent and misinterpret statutes by not following their precedents.").
202. I emphasized this relationship earlier in discussing the lawyer's devotion to the
"little red flag." See supra Part VI.
203. In 2009, the Court issued eighty-six merit opinions. Summary of the Court's
Workload, October Term 2009, SCOTUSBLOG (July 7, 2010), http://www.scotusblog.
com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Charts-070710-2.pdf.
204. Justice Scalia has highlighted the regrettable frequency with which appellate
judges are forced to resort to "totality of the circumstances" tests given the wide factual variation between the relatively few cases they decide. Antonin Scalia, The Rule
of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1178-82 (1989).
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tual analogy, a field of common analysis opens upon which justices
can commonly base their discussion of any particular case. For instance, the analysis applicable to expressive material that may constitute commercial speech, as the Supreme Court described in Central
Hudson and has reinforced in a series of subsequent decisions,2 05 provides an important guide for the discussion of similar cases in the future, allowing judges debating particular factual scenarios to at least
argue within the same analytical framework.2 0 6 If, on the other hand,
a judge reaches a decision without clearly applying (or forthrightly
discarding) the analytical framework laid out in prior opinions, significant confusion can be introduced into the field which could have been
avoided by following a thicker version of stare decisis.20 7 Subsequent
analyses that fail to grow upon or work within an existing precedent
205. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) ("In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it must at least concern
lawful activity and must not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.");
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553-56 (2001) (noting the Court's repeated application of Central Hudson's basic analysis).
206. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently conducted such a debate on the
same analytical terms outlined in Central Hudson, although the majority and dissent
disagreed on the ultimate outcome. See IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263
(2010), affd, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). On review of that decision, the Supreme Court
likewise conducted its debate within the same basic analytical framework. See Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
207. For example, consider the recent history of cases concerning race-conscious
school admissions. In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334-42 (2003), Justice
O'Connor outlined a five-factored test to determine if the University of Michigan
Law School's race-conscious admissions program was narrowly tailored to the
School's claimed compelling interest, diversity in higher education. O'Connor's analysis considered whether the admissions program individually considered applications
along many factors, avoided quotas, considered workable race-neutral alternatives,
avoided undue harm to students of any race, and had some logical endpoint or sunset
provision. Id. at 334, 336, 339, 342. Yet when the court considered race-conscious
school placement programs less than a decade later in Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs.
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), Justice Kennedy's controlling opinion
significantly deviated from O'Connor's clear test without any discussion or explanation. Instead, Kennedy noted his confusion with the implementation and decisionmaking of the plans at bar and seemed to require that program administrators be able
to detail the implementation and supervision of such programs, then returned to more
familiar factors such as the need to consider race-neutral alternatives and allow individualized review. Id. at 785-90. However, Kennedy's analysis did not include consideration of quotas, harm to students of any race, and logical endpoints or sunset
provisions for the program. Thus, the alternative Kennedy left in place of Grutter
significantly muddied the waters regarding race-conscious school admissions programs, presenting a hurdle to both future discussions of the issue amongst the members of the Court and meaningful refinement of the legal principles at play by future
judges. Though not clearly an intentional effort to deceive observers about the direction of the law in the area (an issue I turn to in the following Part), such a decision can
significantly damage the Court's reputation and authority.
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make the project of meaningful judicial debate amongst colleagues
both present and future significantly more laborious. Such a practice
leaves judges far too much leeway to disregard each other and formulate a new and rapid shift within a particular area of discourse, stalling
the broader legal project in which each of them at least claims to
participate. 208
Thus, the humble judge expresses her opinions and analysis in clear
and candid published decisions without intellectual dilution or deception. This promotes a thicker version of stare decisis amongst all members of the bar as part of the project of cross-generational legal
refinement. The judge utilizes prior opinions not just for guidance as
to outcomes, but also for their analytical structure, seeking a common
ground upon which she and her contemporaries might discuss more
precise understandings of the concepts at the core of difficult cases.
This leaves following generations with the strongest adjudicative
roadmap possible and allows those generations to build upon and refine the existing edifice of law.
X.

INTERPRETIVE CHANGE AND THE PROBLEM OF
"SUBTRACTION BY ADDITION

The competing desires for constancy and flexibility in the law have
long been the subject of debate.2 0 9 One foundational observation can
be made: to develop a cohesive society, the law must be able to adjust
some over time. Even a robust theory of precedent does not suggest
that the work of prior judges must be followed by rote in all instances:
"past decisions are thought to provide . .. reason for similar decisions

in the present, conditionalupon its not being the case (or its not being
shown to the decision maker's satisfaction) that the past decision is in
error." 210 Yet change must be sparing enough that unhappy litigants
are not heartened to consistently press identical challenges in an effort
Similar examples are myriad in the Court's constitutional jurisprudence, and are
not merely a modern phenomenon.

See, e.g., Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507,

514-20 (1976) (noting that the analysis of Amalgamated Food Employees Union v.
Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), which held that the exercise of First Amendment rights could not be denied absolutely on a shopping center's property near a
store entrance, was irreconcilable with the analysis in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (1972), which limited the applicability of the First Amendment to handbilling
activity in another shopping center).
208. Appellate courts that issue less candid and more convoluted opinions also disserve the broader public and lower courts, rather than providing much-needed guidance. Courts that "treat[] precedents less than candidly . . . necessarily send mixed

messages. Yet those messages must be interpreted and followed by the lower courts
and government officials." Friedman, supra note 2, at 41.
209. PLATO, supra note 35, at 67-78; ARISTOTLE, POLITIcs 37 (Benjamin Jowett
trans. 2007) (c. 350 B.C.E.) (suggesting that rulers should seek to change the law only
to the point where "the citizen will not gain so much by making the change as he will
lose by the habit of disobedience").
210. Postema, Moral Presence, supra note 131, at 1162.
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to reverse the direction of a particular line of jurisprudence. The success of such strategies might tempt activists to spend far more resources on perpetual litigation on the belief that with enough time and
effort any decision can and will be overruled.2 11 That belief is selfreinforcing and may tempt future judges (who necessarily rise to the
bench only after practicing within the bar that harbors such a belief)
to disregard humility in favor of ill-considered shifts in the legal landscape. Again, humility in the arguments presented by counsel before
the court will reflect the content of the decisions the court has rendered in the past, and a judge's humility in prior decisions is likely to
trickle down to lawyers and influence the style of advocacy practiced
before her. The danger of arbitrariness is ever-present; robust reliance on precedent can be frustrating to those litigants who find their
cases resolved largely by a previously announced decision. But the
law must advance societal ideals while at the same time maintaining a
cohesive structure. Change in the law must remain possible, but it
should be tempered by a strong reliance on and acceptance of precedent both as a political expedient and as the most careful and logical
means for refining the law and adapting it to new situations.
While needed legal change may come from many sources, including
the legislature or administrative agencies, as an institution the judiciary may be especially competent to make some limited alterations to
the law in particular cases. As new and unique situations that legislators never considered become prevalent, it is vital that general legislation apply to challenging new scenarios. Within their historically
miniscule time on the bench, judges have the opportunity to re-examine doctrine that no longer meshes with modern thought.21 2
As I recommended previously, a judge should adopt a thick version
of stare decisis and apply the analytical structure utilized in a prior
written opinion to resolve the particular legal issue at bar, even if she
ultimately concludes that a change in that structure is due. But simply
because prior opinions are written their value is not guaranteed; those
opinions will have the most utility if intellectually candid. The judge
must avoid the temptation to dilute her views for the sake of quelling
controversy when the final decision is released. The legal project
gains most from genuinely expressed viewpoints rather than specious

211. Gentithes, supra note 8, at 812-13, 819.
212. Even philosophers whose work represents substantial leaps would hesitate to
suggest that they have the final word on any given subject. The necessary implication
that any legal thinker will have his work discussed, dissected, and in all likelihood
discarded at some point in the future may seem frightening to the ego of those who
wish to make a lasting contribution. However, there is value in the honest recognition
of the likelihood, and the humility that this realization breeds in one's outlook ultimately produces a more thorough and carefully considered viewpoint.
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arguments made only to protect the judge and the court from
criticism.2 1 3
The process of slow legal refinement described above is not necessarily an invitation for judges to add further "refinements" to an existing analysis, through additional tests or prongs, with an eye towards
essentially reversing the position of a previous decision-an unfortunate process I call "subtraction by addition." In essence, this process
may allow a judge to revive the status quo prior to the more recent
decision even though an extra layer of analytical complexity has been
added. This may be a form of what Barry Friedman refers to as
"stealth overruling," whereby a judge uses "sleight of hand or fiat [to]
simply [chop] the precedent to a stub." 2 14 The subtraction by addition
method may be particularly troubling when adopted by an intellectually dishonest judge purportedly refining a prior decision by adding to
its analysis, while in reality disserving the rationale underlying it.
Consider two decisions, prior decision Alpha and subsequent decision Beta. Decision Beta purports to respect the analytical structure
of Alpha but adds more factors or further tests to Alpha's framework
in a "clarification." These further considerations may effectively undermine the rationale of Alpha. Thus, although the judge has not
overruled any aspect of Alpha, she has discretely expunged it without
announcing the change. A judge can eventually overrule Alpha by
taking part in a two-step process of adding complexity, then suggesting that Alpha be wholly disregarded in that line of precedent.
The process is part of "a sophisticated dance in which the [judges]
take a determined lead and choose their steps carefully." 2 15
Subtraction by addition may be more problematic than it first appears. If undertaken in good faith, it does require a judge to discuss
the propriety of certain aspects of the existing analytical structure, en213. CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 197, at 196 ("A judgment is also no better than
an unreasoned decision when it refers to conflicting cases and does no more than state
that some will be followed or, where this is possible, overruled, without any indication
why such a course is being adopted."). Although Cross and Harris's claim is widely
accepted, some have argued against judicial candor given its potential threats to judicial legitimacy. See Friedman,supra note 2, at 40 n.234 (citing Scott C. Idelman, A
Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1307, 1388-94 (1995); Micah
Schwartzmann, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 988-89 (2008); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 739-50 (1987)).
214. Friedman, supra note 2, at 12. Friedman more fully defines the worrisome
process of stealth overruling, of which the "subtraction by addition" problem may
only be one form, as follows: "'overruling' is (a) the failure to extend a precedent to
its logical conclusion, drawing distinctions that are unfaithful to the prior precedent's
rationale; or (b) reduction of a precedent to essentially nothing, without justifying its
de facto overturning. And stealth occurs when the Justices who do this know better,
such that their decisions are in fact 'dissembling."' Id. at 15-16.
215. Id. at 32. Friedman argues that the Court's recent spate of campaign finance
decisions exemplifies the process of stealth overruling, of which subtraction by addition is one form. "This is not minimalism, properly understood.... It is, in its own
right, aggressive decision making." Id.
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suring that she takes into consideration all the necessary principles of
the broader area of law concerned and perhaps leading her to convince her colleagues that some considerations were missing from the
previous analysis. That process seems to fit within the idea of common-law reasoning, an important element in the incremental refinement of the law that partially defines the appellate judge's project
(although that common law process often entails distinguishing a prior
precedent factually, rather than suggesting that the prior decision was
analytically misguided).2 1 6 Yet the potential pitfalls are significant, especially where a judge's motivations are less pure.2 17 The canny judge
can claim that overturning Alpha is appropriate because "subsequent
legal developments"-namely the very decision, Beta, which the
canny judge authored to excoriate Alpha-suggest so. 2 1 8 The judge
can therefore effect a calculated but unacknowledged overrule of Alpha because "this factor by definition will almost always be met. "219
Such behavior will likely have a trickle-down effect on advocates
before the bench, encouraging them to make repeated and costly efforts to scale back a particular rule of law with an eye towards its
eventual reversal.
Rather than slowly chipping away at a decision through subtraction
by addition, a judge ought to make candid and clear arguments for
any break from prior cases. When declaring a precedent mistaken, a
judge must show that her justification for doing so "is nevertheless a
stronger justification than any alternative that does not recognize any
mistakes, or that recognizes a different set of mistakes." 220 Thus, the
argument should be up-front, directly supplying the reasons why a
prior decision was misguided and ought to be cast aside as "a piece of
legal flotsam or jetsam." 2 2 1 Clear, explicit, and direct overruling of a

216. Benditt, supra note 8, at 98 (quoting William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, The
Benjamin Cardozo Memorial Lecture (1949), reprinted in ALAN F. WESTIN, THE SuPREME COURT: VIEWS FROM INSIDE 122, 133 (1961)) ("In other words the distinguishing of precedents is often a gradual and reluctant way of overruling cases.").
217. This may be especially true in constitutional cases. See Gentithes, supra note
8, at 812-14.
218. In the U.S. Supreme Court, this factor is contained within precedent addressing stare decisis and the appropriate time for overruling a precedent. Friedman, supra
note 2, at 26.
219. Id.
220. Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 14, at 1100.
221. Id. Although it is not an issue I consider here, Dworkin makes an interesting
suggestion as to how one might perceive when a decision is ripe to be labeled a mistake. See id. ("If Hercules discovers that some previous decision, whether a statute
or a judicial decision, is now widely regretted within the pertinent branch of the profession, that fact in itself distinguishes that decision as vulnerable."). Elsewhere, I
have argued against such "widely disregarded" tests for the overturning of previous
decisions. Gentithes, supra note 8, at 814-15.
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prior decision is thus preferable to the more opaque "subtraction by
addition" method.2 22
Consider the contrasting paths taken by the Supreme Court of the
United States in two of its recent decisions touching on congressional
campaign finance reform efforts. In Federal Election Commission v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. ("WRTL"), 22 3 the concurring and dissenting opinions (as well as many commentators 224 ) decried the majority decision as an underhanded excoriation of the decision only
three years earlier in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.2 25
Yet the case engendered little public notice or outcry,2 26 even after the
Court essentially overruled McConnell and struck key elements of
landmark campaign finance reform legislation. 2 27 Three years later,
the Court took a different tack in the much-publicized case of Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission,2 2 8 expressly overruling the
limitations on corporate campaign donations set out two decades earlier. 2 29 Although Citizens United was widely criticized for its potential
to "jeopardize the Court as an institution," 23 0 the clarity of that debate
and criticism in part demonstrates the value of such a direct, candid
overruling. Like it or not, the decision in Citizens United argued
clearly and forcefully for a particular proposition of constitutional law,
rather than confusing the area so severely as to render discussion
amongst judicial colleagues and application by future judges nearly
impossible.2 3 1 While WRTL left constitutional doctrine mired in inco222. The subtraction by addition method may encapsulate an outdated commonlaw view premised upon a much smaller population presenting far more infrequent
challenges to established legal doctrine, a view which thereby elevates the law as established through judicial decisions above the realm of mere political power play. See
WALDRON, supra note 147, at 24 (discussing the "appealing anonymity of [judgemade] law" and its "distance from or independence of politics."); Schauer, Common
Law, supra note 156, at 781 (arguing that complex modern society requires more than
the mere settlement of disputes as they arise; there is also an important "guidance
function of law.").
223. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
224. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court'sDeregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064 (2008); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Futureof ConstitutionalLaw,

82 TUL. L. REV. 1533 (2008).
225. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
226. Friedman, supra note 2, at 38 (noting the dearth of coverage on the decision in
most major newspapers).
227. Id. at 11-12.
228. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
229. Id. at 913 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652

(1990)).
230. Friedman, supra note 2, at 39.

231. Id. at 5 ("In deciding by stealth rather than explicitly, the Justices necessarily
pay a price in the clarity of the message they convey."). Friedman emphasizes the
social costs of such stealth overruling, which is necessarily done to avoid public attention with the attendant uproar and loss in judicial esteem. Id. at 42. This will often
encourage defiance and disobedience of judicial edicts. Id. at 50-53 (describing the
widespread disregard for the Miranda decision).
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herence, Citizens United gave current and future judges a meaningful
starting ground for debate, disagreement, or even future changes to
the rationale underlying that strand of jurisprudence.
While subtraction by addition is less desirable than candid overruling, I emphasize that the least desirable method for shifts in legal doctrine is a decision wholly lacking an honest effort to work within the
analytical structure of a prior decision or obtain consensus on the existence of its flaws. Even slowly undermining precedent remains preferable to simply ignoring the existing analysis of a given legal issue and
presenting a new approach more to a particular judge's liking. Judges
in that undesirable scenario simply talk past each other. Such muddled discourse starting with flatly contradictory analytical approaches
is anathema to the ongoing legal refinement that the humble judge
seeks to promote. Judges should instead prove their point on the
same playing field as their intellectual opponents or suggest why that
playing field itself ought to be fundamentally altered.

The relationship between the age of a precedent and the authority it
carries is also an important consideration in any potential overruling.
It would seem that long-standing precedents should be more entrenched than recently issued opinions, especially if one takes the view
that judges engage in a continuous refinement of abstract legal principles. Under that conception, prior advancements in our understanding of legal ideals represent foundations upon which all current
commentary and refinement should be based; undermining those basic principles of law necessitates a complete reevaluation of an entire
strand of jurisprudence, a project not to be undertaken lightly.
But while the age of a prior decision may grant it some favor, age is
only one factor in a decision's weightiness; perhaps of equal importance is the sum of precedent behind that decision, building upon previous decisions over generations. Especially when that precedent has
been recapitulated in a recent opinion, both the long-standing tradition and the modern take upon it must be respected as much as possible. Reconsideration and approval of a long-standing precedent gives
it an even stronger claim to continued respect from current and future
justices:
When a precedent has been repeatedly reexamined and reaffirmed,
over many years by a Court whose composition has changed, that
should give us greater confidence that the precedent is correct. An
old precedent that has never been reexamined, but has simply
slipped into the background, has less of a claim on our allegiance
than one that has been critically reexamined and reaffirmed; the
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later precedent is more likely to reflect the kind of accumulated
practical wisdom that the common law approach values.232
The fact that a particular analysis within a precedent has been repeatedly reviewed and approved lends it special weight above and beyond
its age.23 3 Even more than simple longevity, the repeated reaffirmation of an analysis strongly counsels against overruling it in favor of a
new approach more in line with a present-day justice's viewpoint.2 34
XI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Judges on appellate courts are faced with the challenge of offering
decisions that continue to refine our understanding of society's basic
commitments without so radically altering the social landscape as to
engender widespread disapproval or disregard for the courts or the
ideals they purport to serve. In this Article, I have argued that a just
decision is one that strikes the proper balance between those often
competing aims of adjudication and, in turn, one that takes a humble
approach heavily reliant on the analysis contained in precedent cases.
Mine is not the first view to oppose the detractors of such dutiful respect for prior decisions, but it draws a uniquely strong, direct connection between precedent and justice. It therefore supplements theories
grounded in the pragmatic ends served by reliance on precedent or in
the independent normative virtues such reliance will typically uphold.
In my view, a just decision necessarily has a humble author who respects precedent for the role it plays in the cross-generational refinement of the law and the horizontal debate amongst modern-day
judges. The humble approach taken by a just decision's author also
implies her desire for clear, well-reasoned opinions that take a conservative tack to modifications of prior doctrine. Justice and precedent can thus be seen as working in lockstep rather than at
232. STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 96.
233. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877, 892 (1996) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
864-70 (1992) (plurality opinion) ("New precedents, at least to the extent that they
reflect a reaffirmation and evolution of the old, count for more than old precedents
that have not been reconsidered.").
234. The discussion in this Part suggests that the opportunities to repeatedly litigate
a settled controversy, especially in constitutional jurisprudence, should be limited.
One (somewhat radical) option is to limit the opportunities for a direct challenge to a
precedent, either in time or number-that is, either no challenges for X years or only
X challenges can ever be made to a given precedent, such as Roe or Heller. The timeframe limitation could be based on a specific number of years or tied to external
events like changes to the bench or party in power. Reconsideration of precedent at
clear, distinct intervals far enough apart that citizens perceive the law as intelligible
and constant is highly desirable.
In the United States, the Supreme Court could practice such limitations to the exercise of its certiorarijurisdiction, deterring any approach nearing perpetual relitigation.
Indeed, some theorists have hinted that added limitations on the sorts of cases that a
high court considers would be worthwhile. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBEs, supra
note 72, at 243 (discussing Rawls).
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loggerheads, ensuring pride of place for prior cases in any theory of
adjudication.
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